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SYNOPSIS 
The object of this thesis is to analyse members' 
attitudes to the principle of preference contained in the 
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Bill (1904). 
In light of this object the primary problem is to explain 
the significance of the Preference Clause. 
Part I introduces the main theme, that the significance 
of the Preference Clause is explained by two circumstances. 
The first is an explanation of how arbitration became the 
solution to the pattern of ind.us trial relations which 
developed, and the place of preference in arbitration. 
The second circumstance is the place of the Preference 
Clause in the party machinations of the period while 
observing that these circumstances both determine and 
affect members' attitudes. 
Part II (1860-1890) describes the pattern of industrial 
relations up to the point of the industrial crisis of the 
Mari time Strike. 
Part III ( 1891-1901) relates the crisis of the strike to 
the industrial and political developments in this decade. 
The industrial event of arbitration and the political 
event of the formation of Parliamentary Labour Parties 
form the immediate background to the crisis over prefer-
ence. The description of arbitration demonstrates the 
rationale behind preference while the description of the 
- v -
of the Labour Party demonstrates the reason why prefer-
ence should be distasteful to members when advocated by 
a Labour Party. 
Part IV constitutes the main body of the thesis. It 
describes in broad terms the form of the crisis and 
speci:fica.lly the members' attitudes. 
Part V concludes in the form of a postscript, coramenting 
briefly on the fortunes of the preference clause and the 
clause controlling political status of unions over the 
next decade. 
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ill .... PAR ......... T ........ I______ IN=TR=_ODUCTI ON 
Industrial relations problems throughout 
AustraJ.ia climaxed in the period 1890-1894. It is sur-
prising perhaps that the major theme of the strL~e was 
reproduced in the legal sphere when the sharpest debates 
of the Conciliation and Arbitration Bill were those 
referring to the Preferential Clause. In 1890 unions 
had become less concerned with hours, wages or conditions 
of work for, 
11 
••• beyond these individual needs • • • stood 
a deeper problem of status involving a sharper 
clash of interests." (1) 
The 'clash of interests' was caused by the development 
of a different need which related specifically to organi-
zation of the unskilled worlcer. The unskilled worker 
gave new form to unionism because of insecurity in 
employment. The members lacking in skills could be 
readily replaced and this insecurity was reflected in 
( 1) N. s. Woods, Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration in New Zealand ~Government Printer, 
Wellington, New Zealand, 19 3) p. 30. Thia 
statement was made in reference to the 
character of the New Zealand unionism of 
this period but may be aptly used to convey 
the Australian circumstance. 
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the demand for the 'closed shop'. (1) In the debates on 
the Commonwealth Arbitration Bill, union security was 
represented in that clause requiring employers to give 
preferential status to union members. (2) 
The demand for preference created a political 
reaction to the efficacy of trade unionism from all 
parties. The attitudes expressed reflect members' 
personal ex:i;;erience of industrial strife or of legis-
lation concerned with arbitration. The debates centred 
around abolishment or modification of both the principle 
of preference and the institution of trade unionism. 
The debates were in a sense real ones. In the days before 
rigid party structure debate could literally persuade 
members to cross the floor in a three-party situation. 
It was a subtle game in which cleverly worded amendments 
had major political effects. Behind such a 'game' played 
about the principle of preference there hung in the 
(1) This term defines a situation where an employer 
agrees to only employ uni on members. 
(2) The term 'union security' is taken from J.E. 
Isaac and G. w. Ford, A1!5!!ralian Labour Rela-
.1!.2!!s Readings (Melbourne, 1966), p. 114. I 
have used the term to mean the existence of 
economic circumstance or legal status which 
protects the present existence of unions and 
allows for their further strengthening. 
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balance the continued administration of the Labour Party. 
In sum, the primary analysis of members' 
attitudes to preference is anchored in the circumstances 
of the Preference Clause, appreciating at the same time 
that these circumstances often determined members ' 
attitudes. The first circumstance lay with the partic-
ular pattern of industrial relations problems and the 
place of the preference principle in the solution of the 
legal system of arbitration. The second circumstance 
was the significance of the Preference Clause in the 
party machinations of the period. In the event of the 
crisis, members' attitudes were often formed by their 
circumstance in the industrial scheme, and were occasion-
ally dominated by their party situation. 
- 4 -
ill PART II THE GROWTH OF UNIONISM 
AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
The particular pattern of industrial relations 
which developed between 1860 and 1890 have an immense 
significance to understanding the various assessments of 
trade unionism and solutions to the problems of indust-
rial 'warfare' expressed in the Commonwealth Legislature 
in 1904. The dominating theme in the formation of 
relationships between employers and employees is that 
the relationship was expressed through the process of 
collective bargaining. Sidney and Beatrice Webb provide 
the most workable definition of this form of the indust-
rial reJ.ationship, 
( 1 ) 
"But if a group of workmen concert together 
and send representatives to conduct the 
bargaining on behalf of the whole body, the 
position is at once changed. Instead of 
the employer making a series of separate 
contracts with isolated individuals, he 
meets witl a collective will, and settles, 
in a single agreement, the principles upon 
which, for the time being, all workmen of 
a particular group, or class, or grade will 
be engaged." (1) 
Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democracy 
(Longmans, London, 1902 ed.), p. 173. 
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The 'collective will' is of course based in the 
organization of the trade union. 
The outline of the development in this section 
will be from the change in the circumstances of the 
economy in the 1850's, which led to a major expansion of 
economic activity and a simultaneous development in 
labour organization, until the Mari time Strike of 1890-4 
led to a serious reappraisal of collective bargaining. 
The discussion will first examine the significance of 
the economy to the particular pattern of industrial 
relations which developed. The second area of discussion 
will be a review of the growth and nature of trade unions. 
The final area will consist of an examination of the 
relationship between a specific form of trade unionism 
and the Maritime Strike, ae well as commenting on the 
form and impact of the strike itself. 
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In evaluating the forces that conditioned the 
attitudes of employers and employees towards each other, 
it is a primary consideration that the nature and strength 
of labour organization rest on economic circumstances. 
The roots of the Australian arbitration system extend 
back to the discovery of gold in the 1850's. This dis-
covery changed drastically the economic circumstances of 
the colonies. It caused the injection, which continued, 
of necessary overseas capital, 
"By 1860, a considerable inflow of British 
capital had occurred, particularly into 
financial, trading and mineral enterprises. 
After 1860, British investors continued to 
look to Australia as an outlet for overseas 
in vestment ••• " ( 1 ) 
Secondly it led to a trebling of the total 
population; from 405,000 in 1851 to 1 ,156,000 in 1861. (2) 
The creation of a significant work force was a 
step basic to the organisation of labour, 
( 1) 
(2) 
"A predominantly pastoral economy with thinly 
scattered workers consisting of a large pro-
portion of convicts, emancipists and indentured 
N. G. Butlin, Investment in Australian 
Economic Development 1861-1900 (Cambridge, 1964), 
p. 33. 
Ibid, P• 39. 
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labour, a hostile public outlook and a restric-
tive legal framework do not in total provide a 
favourable environment for union growth. Such 
were the circumstances in Australia before 
1850. 11 ( 1) 
Between 1860 and 1890 the characteristics of 
the economy rested on two circumstances: the acceleration 
of the growth rate and the specific allocation of econo-
mic resources which gave particular patterns of employment. 
The rate of growth was not entirely even, it was upwards 
in the period 1872-1890, while there was some stagnation 
in the 1860's. The first period of rapidly rising 
investment was followed by recession in 1866, halting 
recovery and uncertainty and a second run down of invest-
ment in 1870. (2) In 1871 the level of capital formation 
began to rise, interrupted by slight recessions in 1878-9, 
1882 and 1885, 
( 1) 
(2) 
(3) 
" ••• this was the great investment boom which 
underlay the general economic growth of the 
period. Though the pace slackened after 1866, 
significant decline was delayed until the end 
of 1888." (3) 
~. E. Isaac & G. w. Ford, ed. Australian 
Labour Relations Readings, p. 75. 
N. G. Butlin, Investment in Australian 
Economic Development 1861-1900, p. 42. 
Ibid, p. 43. 
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Elsewhere N. G. Butlin's figures show an annual average 
formation of new capital during 1861-71 of £6,992,000 
and £20,447 ,ooo during 1872-91. (1) There were three 
main fields of new capital formation in the period 
1860-90: residential building, agriculture and pastoral 
investment and railways. (2) The significant feature 
for industrial organization of such allocation of econo-
mic resources has been highlighted by P. G. McCarthy. 
He calls the economy 'labour intensive' for the unskilled. (3) 
There was simultaneously a chronic scarcity of labour, 
not generalised before 1870 and in the main confined to 
the period 1870-1885. N. G. Butlin describes the cir-
cumstance, using in part the successes of labour organ-
izations as evidence, 
( 1) 
(2) 
(3) 
0 The growing power of the trade unions, the 
relative ease in securing wage increases, 
the steady rise in wage-rates, especially 
N. G. Butlin, Some Aspects of Australian 
Capital Formation 1861-1900. Paper presented 
to Australian and New Zealand Association for 
the Advancement of Science Congress, (Melbourne, 
1955). From R. N. Ebbels (L. G. Churchward, ed.) 
The Australian Labour Movement, 1850-1907 
(Melbourne, 1965) p. 3. 
Ibid, p. 3. 
P. G. McCarthy, 'Laboui~ and the Living age 
1890-1910', The Australian Journal of Politics 
and History, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (1967), p. 67. 
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real wages throughout the 'seventies and the 
retention of a high plateau of wages during 
the 'eighties, ••• are all indirect indica-
tions of a sellers' market :ror labour." (1) 
The salient features of the economy for a developing system 
of industrial relations was, in the long run, the combin-
ation of a major bias in the economy towards unskilled 
workers and a shortage of labour conducive to successful 
trade union organization. 
( 1) N. G. Butlin, Investment in Australian 
Economic Development 1861-1900, p. 390. 
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Evaluation of the pattern of trade union 
development between 1860-1890 is complex. Even the 
description of the rate of growth of trade unionism 
is difficult as there is no co mprehensive study avail-
able relating to the membership of unions. There are 
however discernable characteristics in the expansion of 
unionism. (1) The figures for the formation of trade 
unions are not very detailed. Bede Nairn, using two 
major sources - the Minutes of the Trades and Labour 
Council and the Literary Appen:lix of the Report of the 
Royal Commission on Strikes - states that between 1850 
and 1880, forty-four trade unions were formed in New 
South iales, and of the forty-four unions, twenty-nine 
were formed in the decade 1870-79. (2) Further, he states, 
urn the following decade unionism spread into 
practically every field of employment in the 
colony: in 1890 there were nominally 100 
(1) See J. T. Sutcliffe, Trade Unionism in Australia, 
pp. 76-81, for a full list of the legalisation 
by various colonies of trade unionism. It may 
be observed here that the legalisation came some 
time after the establishment of trade unions -
the first three acts were: South Australia, 1876; 
New South Wales, 1881; and Victoria, 1884. 
(2) N. B. Nairn, 'The Role of the Trades and Labour 
Council in New South Wales 1871-1891', Historical 
Studies Australia and New Zealand, Vol. 7, No. 28 
p. 432. 
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unions • 11 ( 1 ) 
Robin Gollan breaks down the figure of one hundred unions 
and states sixty were formed between 1880-6, and forty to 
1900. (2) He states that Victoria saw a similar expan-
sion of trade unionism, with more unions created in the 
first half of the decade. (3) Thus in these main colonies 
the first half of the decade of the eighties was the 
period of the maximum rate of trade union formation. J. T. 
Sutclif:f'e gives a representative list of unions formed 
during this period and concludes that, 
11 
••• the spirit of combination on the part of 
the workers was general throughout the whole 
of the colonies." (4) 
The expansion of unionism however was made sig-
nificant by the implications of the fact that even in 
1901 there were only 100,000 trade unionists in a work 
force of over a million and a half. (5) 
( 1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
Ibid, P• 432. 
Robin Gollan, Radical and Working Class Politics, 
A Stu4y of Eastern Australia, 1850-1910, 
{Melbourne, 1966) p. 432. 
Ibid, p. 432. 
J. T. Sutclif'fe, A History of Trade Unionism 
in Australia (Melbourne, 1967), p. 50. 
I. Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics, The 
Labour ~ovement in Eastern Australia 1900-1921 
(Canberra, 1965l7P• 7. 
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The implications of the possibility of the erosion of 
unionism by non-unionists was realised with the organ-
ization of the unskilled worker. (1) 
The 'traditional' discussion of the pattern 
of trade unions between 1860 and 1890 is misleading. 
This is because the type of membership is stressed at 
the expense of the method of trade union activity. In 
this approach unions are categorized into two major types, 
i.e. having a membership either of skilled, or semi-
skilled and unskilled workers, bearing diametrically 
opposed characteristics. Historians describe the form 
of the craft or skilled union with the following series 
of characteristics, 
( 1) 
(2) 
"The unions were designed to protect the 
interests of the craft by restricting entry 
through the apprentice system, by establish-
ing wages and conditions of work appropriate 
to the craftman's dignity, and by providing 
financial help in cases of unemployment, sick-
ness or death." (2) 
See Page 19. 
I. Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics, 
p. 7. Refer also Churchward (ed.) The 
Australian Labour Movement 1850-1907, pp. 15-16 
and Jean E. O'Connor, 'A Turning Point in Labour 
History: A Reply to Mrs Phillip', Historical 
Studies Australia and New Zealand, Vol. 7, No. 16, 
( 1 951 ) , p. 35 7. 
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While these are the characteristics of the organization 
of the skilled workers in this period, their engagement 
in the collective bargaining process is undermined, 
11 
••• (with) benefit provisions making them as 
much benefit societie a as trade uni one." ( 1) 
or again their motivation, 
"They were progenitors of the 8-hour day, 
inspired more by their fervant belief in 
self-improvement than by expectation of 
inunediate self-advancement." (2) 
The form of the 'new unionism• is differentiated by the 
membership being unskilled and semi-skilled and not 
exclusive, and their being less concerned with benefits 
for members. However the unions are described as having 
the characteristics of •collective bargaining• and the 
'mass strike' and again it is these characteristics in 
the methods of this type of union that are misleading. (3) 
The effect is to deny or undermine the significance of 
collective bargaining throughout the period and in a 
sense to miss out on the implications of 'new unionism' 
in industrial relations. 
( 1 ) 
( 2) 
(3) 
Jean E. O'Connor, 18$)0 - A Turning Point in 
Labour History, Op. cit., p. 357. 
I. Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics, 
p. 7. 
' 
Ibid, p. 7. 
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Concentration on the role of the trade unions 
in the economic dislocations demonstrates tr£ use of the 
strike by all unions during the period. Y. hile the benefit 
aspect of the craft unions was important the unions were 
not primarily friendly societies, 
"They were trade societies, trade unions, with 
their objects industrial." (1) 
The first notable industrial struggle, for the eight-hour 
day, was not achieved without use of the strike-weapon: 
The Agricultural Implement Makers' Union of Victoria suc-
ceeded in securing a reduction of hours from ten to eight 
(1872) but the wages were lowered, and in 1873 the union 
entered a strike for higher wages which lasted two months 
and was successful. (2) By 1871 bricklayers, builders 
and labourers, and carpenters 'had won' an eight-hour day 
in New South Wales and in Victoria the stonemasons won an 
eight-hour day in 1856 and in 1870 it was extended to all 
government contracts. (3) 
( 1) 
( 2) 
(3) 
N. B. Nairn, The Role of the Trades and Labour 
Council in N.s.w •• 1871-1891, Op. cit., p. 424. 
J. T. Sutcliffe, Trade Unionism in Australia, 
p. 54. 
C. M. H. Clark, Select Documents in Australian 
History 1851-1900 (Sydney, 1968), p. 735. 
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This initial struggle had widespread ramific-
ations for the developing system of industrial relations. 
The eight-hour principle had no legal enactment (with the 
exception of the Victorian legislation covering women and 
children in factories in 1871 and mineworkers in 1877, 
and the Western Australian legislation of 1896); it was 
an industrial agreement between employer and union. 
There was also an early use of a body representing trade 
unions on a federated level. In New South Wales the 
Trades and Labour Council took over leadership of the 
1874 Iron Trades strike. The Minutes of the Trades and 
Labour Council describe how Mr Dixon (Secretary of the 
Council) met the employers and after the propositions 
had been submitted, 
11 
••• a deputation of the men was introduced; 
and the employers and (they) discussed the 
matter over; and after they had all retired, 
the Chairman and Secretary of both employers 
and men and Mr Dixon remained and drew up 
the agreement and signed it." (1) 
It was success in negotiating and bargaining that has been 
seen as an impetus to trade union formation. In this 
instance of the Iron Trades Strike, Bede Nairn records 
( 1 ) N. B. Nairn, 'The Role of the Trades and Labour 
Council in N.S. \ ·., 1871-1891 ', Op. cit., p. 426. 
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tbat in January 1874 there were twelve unions affiliated 
to the New South Wales Trades and Labour Council, and 
twelve months later, in December 1874, there wer e twenty-
five. ( 1) 
The pattern of industrial disputes and settle-
ment between 1875 and 1885 follows the patterns seen in 
the eight-hour day movement. The motif of this period 
however was negotiation and co-operation (but within the 
bounds set by the strike and lock-out limit). The aspect 
of arbitration in industrial settlements was significant, 
R. B. Walker states, 
"Before the time of the great str ike of 1890 
arbitration agreements were made voluntarily 
on an industry-by-industry basis." (2) 
!any examples of settlement by arbitration have been 
recorded. (3) One documented example is the approach 
by the Victorian Operative Bootmakers• Trade Union to 
the Bootmanufacturers' Association. It is recorded in the 
(1) Ibid, p. 426. 
(2) R. B. Valker, 'Australia's Second Arbitration 
Act', Labour History, No. 19, 1970, p. 18. 
(3) See June Phillips, 'The Turning Point of 
Labour History', Historical Studies Australia 
and New Zealand., Vol. 7, No. 16, 1951, p. 149 
for some examples. 
- 17 -
minutes of the Union of 19 February 1883 that on 12 
February the committee of the union had submitted the 
following resolutions to the employers: 
"(1) That the union desire a uniform rate 
of wages for each class of work 
throughout the trade and 
(2) That for the purpose of obtaining that 
end the present representatives shall 
sit in conference to decide the matter 
under the Presidency of an independent 
Chairman, who shall act as Arbitrator 
in all cases where the votes are e~ual 
and whose decision shall be final.' (1) 
The theme of trades councils acting on behalf of trades 
unions con tinued with the use of arbitration. In the 
strike of the Victorian Wharf Labourer's Union which 
began on 1 January 1886, a basis was found for arbitra-
tion. The arbitrators were selected by the Employers' 
Union and the Trades Hall Council. (2) The most compre-
hensive level of trade union organization, the Inter-
colonial Trade Union Congresses, reflect the theme of 
( 1) 
(2) 
Minute Books of the Victorian Operative 
Bootmakers' Trade Union, 19/2/83; (from 
R. N. Ebbels (L. G. Churchward ed.) The 
Australian Labour Movement 1850-1 90-r,-
P • 83. 
J. T. Sutcliffe, Australian Trade Unionism, 
p. 60. 
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voluntary co-operation by means of arbitration. The 4th 
Intercolonial Trades Union Congress (Adelaide, September 
1886) carried a motion by Mr Trenworth (Trades Hall 
Council, Victoria) urging the colonies to establish 
boards of conciliation and arbitration. Mr w. A. Robinson 
(Secretary of the Trades Hall Council of South Australia) 
seconded him with these words, 
"In all trades difficulties the first steps 
that should be taken were arbitration and 
conciliation. Strikes were a relic of a 
barbaric age, and it was time that before 
they ever entered upon a strike they should 
think of the other people who would be 
affected ••• Arbitration was growing, and 
as it grew so would their unions become 
stronger and more moderate ••• 11 (1) 
The maritime strike four years later demonstrated the 
failure of this optimism for co-operation and of the use 
of arbitration. 
The change from co-operation to the industrial 
disharmony of the major strikes of 1890-94 was created 
when a different pattern of unionism, widely termed 'new 
(1) Official Report of the 4th Intercolonial 
Trades Union Congress, Adelaide, September 
1886. (From) R. N. Ebbels The Australian 
Labour Movement 1850-190-Z, p. 96. 
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unionism', upset the delicate balance o'f: the domination 
of the union type, the cra'f:t union. The circumstances 
o'f: the 'new unionism' has an especial significance both 
for the crisis in industrial relations (1890-4) and for 
the problems of legislating about arbitration over the 
next two decades. The primary problem raised during the 
crisis and worsened by the depression that followed was 
that of union security. 
The centre of the problem o'f: union security 
was an economic circumstance. The economy was primary 
and constructive and the 'new unionism' developed in 
three major areas - the mining, pastoral and transport 
industries. (1) Hence it was that, 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
11 
••• without special skills, their members 
were largely interchangeable and could 
easily be replaced, so that inter-union 
co-operation and the ability to exclude 
non-unionists 'f:rom employment were more 
vital to them than to the craft unions. 11 (2) 
The major unions formed were the Amalgamated 
Miners' Association (1874), the Federated 
Seamen's Union (1876), and the Amalgamated 
Shearers' Union (1886). The basis or organ-
ization was national rather than local or 
state. Refer tow. G. Spence, Australia's 
Awakening (Sydney 1909), pp. 18-26, 47-51 '!:or 
a description of the organizing o'f: the miners 
and shearers. 
L. F. Fitzhardinge, William Morris Hughes,~ 
Political Biography, Vol. I, That Fiery Particle, 
1862-1914 (Sydney 1964), P• 20. 
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The union rules reflect the need to protect the union from 
encroachment by non-unionists. The Rules of the Amalgam-
ated Miners' Association (1890) stated, 
"No member of this Branch shall be allowed to 
accept any daily or weekly wage below the 
current rate ruling ••• nor shall any member 
be allowed to work with non-members." ( 1) 
and a similar restriction was included in the General 
Rules of Amalgamated Shearers' Union of Australasia, 
"Any member violating the Union rules by 
shearing in non-union sheds shall be fined 
£5 for the first shed (etc) ••• Member a 
shearing in more than three non-union sheds 
to be expelled f'rom the Union." (2) 
Thus the characteristic feature of 'new unionism' the 
ideology can be seen as acting as a cohesive force. The 
most basic statement, in the context of this ideology, 
is an appeal to 'mateship', 
( 1) 
"Daily, as the various and widespread sections 
of the human family are being insensibly 
drawn into closer touch with each other, it 
(2) B -Laws of the Amal amated Shearers' Union 
of Australasia. From Ibid, p. 11 • 
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becomes clearer that men should become co-oper-
ators - mates - instead of' antagonists. "No 
man liveth to himself'. e are all mutually 
dependent one upon another." (1) 
The 'co-operation' suggested however did not embrace the 
employer. The co-operation was within the union, and at 
the expense of' the employer, 
( 1) 
(2) 
"Experience has taught us that no great ref'orm 
can be secured otherwise than by systematic 
organized ef'f'ort. Alone we can agitate. 
Organized we can compel." (2) 
Pref'ace to the Rules of' the Australian Workers' 
Union (Sydney, 1894), ('from) C. M. H. Clark, 
Select Documents, p. 743. 
lb id, p. 743 • 
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Between 1890 and 1894 there were a number or 
serious strikes and lock-outs in the eastern colonies. 
The key to the situation lies in the Maritime Strike 
(August to November, 1890) centred mainly in New South 
Wales but also in Victoria and South Australia. Although 
there is no need in the context of this discussion to 
examine f'ully the wider issues of the strike, clearing 
up the technicality of the cause of strike is a necess-
ary step to putting it in perspective. (1) N. B. Nairn 
has concentrated on examining the technicality of the 
cause of the Maritime Strike in New South Wales. (2) 
His thesis supports the statement of P. J. Brennan, 
President of the Trades and Labour Council, to the Royal 
Commission held to investigate the strike, 
( 1) 
(2) 
"I am under the impression from conversations 
I have had with pastoralists that the non-
union wool question would not have come to a 
head but for its being connected with the 
See generally Introduction to The Australian 
Labour Movement 1850-jtO] (extracts from con-
temporary documents se ected by R. N. Ebbels); 
B. Fitzpatrick, Sho~t History of the Australian 
Labour Movement (Melbourne, 1940); R. A. Gollan, 
Radical and Working Class Politics in Australia; 
J. T. Sutcliffe, A History of Trade Unionism in 
Australia. 
N. B. airn, 'The 1890 Maritime Strike in New 
South 1r ales', Historical Studies Australia and 
New Zealand, Vol. 10, No. 37 (1961 ). 
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shipping question ••• but the officers (marine) 
came out and pr ec ipi ta ted the whole thing. 11 ( 1 ) 
It appears that he is almost certainly accurate when he 
states that there was no preconceived aim of 'the annihil-
ation of unionism' on the part of employers and that com-
pared with union organization before the strike, employer 
organization, on a f'ully representative scale, was embry-
onic. 
view, 
~hile we cannot f'ully accept w. G. Spence 's 
"Experience has shown that ever since its 
establishment the Employers' Union has set 
itself against conferences with the workers ' 
Unions, and has fought for freedom of contract. 
It seeks to ignore collective bargaining, and 
tries to force into practice individualism 
between employer and employee." (2) 
the Maritime Strike enforces the reality of the 1 closed 
shop' issue in two major ways. Firstly that the 'closed 
shop' issue was important to the Unions involved in the 
strike, 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
" ••• he (Spence) believed that he could mani-
pulate the whole movement to gain 'the closed 
Ibid, p. 3. 
w. G. Spence, Australia's Awakening (Sydney, 
1909), p. 66. This statement is not accurate 
in the sense that Spence saw this as a pre-
conceived intention of employers before the 
strike, and the form of the strike as a 'lock-
out ' ( p • 75 ) • 
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shop' objective of the Shearers' Union in 1890, 
even after he had been promised this objective 
by the Pastoralists' Union for 1891 ." (1) 
Spence made an agreement on 12 August with representatives 
of the Maritime Unions, when it was decided that wool 
shorn by non-union labour would not be handled by the 
Wharf Labourers ' Union members, and every Maritime Union 
in New South ales was pledged to support a general boy-
cott of such wool. (2) The struggle for the ' closed 
shop' was centred in the Pastoral Industry. Although 
N. B. Nairn states of Spence's reminiscences, 
11 
••• this work is so full of errors as to be 
a most misleading guide to consideration of 
any of the events with which it deals ••• " (3) 
Spence's details of the struggle in this work, includ-
ing warfare between unionists and non-unionists, and 
the use of the boycott weapon by pastoralists are I 
feel, reflective of the nature of a genuine struggle 
over the'closed shop ' principle. (4) 
(1) N. B. Nairn, ' The 1890 ~aritime Strike in New 
South Wales ' , Op. cit., p. 3. 
(2) J. T. Sutcliffe, A History of Trade Uni onism 
in Australia, p. 103. 
(3) N. B. Nairn, 'The 1890 aritime Strike in ew 
South · ales', Op. cit., p. 1. 
(4) Refer w. G. Spence, Australia ' s Awakening, 
pp. 55-58. 
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The second way the Maritime Strike enforces 
the reality of the 'closed shop' issue, is in terms of 
its effect. This is the sense of the significance of 
the strike, as an event which had the effect, 
u ••• to dramatize the conflict between them 
(capital a.nd labour) • 11 ( 1 ) 
Specifically it gave, 
11 
••• new confidence to the employers, at 
least in the industries involved. 11 (2) 
and encouraged them, 
" ••• to pursue subsequently a ver·~,r bitter 
policy towards their workers ••• " (3) 
The employers demonstrated their newly-won position in 
various ways when dealing with the defeated unionists. 
A single example of the new relutionship is reflected, 
by this question asked by various establishments in 
Victoria on application for employment, 
( 1 ) 
( 2) 
(3) 
11V ill you please say if you uphold the prin-
ciple of freedom of contract, or whether you 
L. F. Fitzhardinge, Wi lliam Morris Hughes, 
Vol. I 7 That Fiery Particle, p. 28. 
Ibid, p. 28. 
N. B. Nairn, 'The Maritime Strike in New South 
\ ·ales ' , Op • cit • , p • 2 • 
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could only work on strictly union lines? 11 (1) 
The position of trade unionism was :t'urther assaulted in 
defeats in a number of bitter and extensive strikes (in 
Eastern Australia) in 1891-1894. (2) 
Finally, the strike crisis was not simply a 
temporary defeat in the field of industrial action. It 
was the simultaneous feature of depression which seriously 
undermined unionism. The new circumstances are described 
by Coghlan, 
"New South Wales was the chief suff'erer from 
the strike, as its immediate result was to 
depress industry of every kind. Employment 
was reduced and wages lowered; large numbers 
of men in various occupations were thrown out 
of work, unskilled labourers especially find-
ing it difficult to obtain employment • 11 (3) 
There is however (as Coghlan indicates elsewhere), no 
simple causal connection between the strikes and the 
( 1 ) 
( 2) 
(3) 
J. T. Sutcliffe, A History of Trade Unionism 
in Australia, p. 48. For further examples 
refer Ibid, pp. 99-101. 
See Introduction by L. G. Churchward, The 
Australian Labour Movement 1850-1907, ~ 18-
20. 
T. A. Coghlan, Labour and Industry in Australia, 
(London, 1918), Vol. III, P• 1606-7. 
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financial collapse of 1893. (1) N. G. Butlin indicates 
that the problem was firstly basic to the economy and 
secondly lcng term, in that public capital formation 
declined from 1891 (recovered briefly in 1901-2) and 
further stagnated until 1909. (2) The Strike therefore 
which caused 
11
••• the powerfully renewed hope of the 
employers that they were at last to be rid 
of the incubus of unionism • 11 (3) 
led into a decade in which economic circumstances were 
unfavourable to labour organization. The pattern of the 
decade, P. G. McCarthy reminds us, was one in which 
( 1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
tt ••• trade unions were deprived of their 
relative power in the collective bargaining 
process ... (4) 
T. A. Coghlan, A Statistical Accoun..:L.Q! 
Australia and New Zealand 1 02- , from 
J.E. Isaac and G. w. Ford ed. , Australian 
Labour Relations Readings, p. 99. See 
generally for a description of the depression 
Ibid, pp. 99-100; N. G. Butlin, Investment 
in Australian Economic Development 1861-1900, 
pp. 407-451; c. M. H. Clark, Select Documents, 
pp. 295-314· 
N. G. Butlin, Australian Domestic Product, 
Investment and Forei Borrowin 1861-1 a 8 , 
Tab e 2 OB, pp. from P. G. McCarthy, 
Labour and the Living Wage 1890-1904, Op. cit., 
P• 67. 
N. B. Nairn, 'The 1890 Maritime Strike in New 
South Wales ' , Op. cit., p. 2. 
P. G. McCarthy, Labour and the Living Wage 
1890-1910, Op. cit., P• 68. 
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ill PART III THE CREATION OF THE 
LABOUR PARTY; THE EXTENSION 
OF INDUSTRIAL LEGISU TION 
The decade 1891-1901 witnessed an evolution of 
primary significance in political and industrial devel-
opments. The major political event was the foundation 
of the New South Wales Parliamentary Labour Party (the 
other colonial Labour Parties) and finally the Federal 
Labour Party. The major industrial development was the 
creation of legislation concerning arbitration. Both 
these even ts were the result of the .iari time Strike. An 
analysis of these developments is essential for our pur-
poses. They not only separately form the basis of the 
crisis over the Conciliation and Arbitrstion Bill in 1904, 
but the crisis derives its pattern from the fact that they 
converge at the point of the Preference Clause. The sense 
in which they are interrelated was not realised in this 
decade. That sense is, the significance of the Labour 
Party legislating to order the status of the trade unions 
while they remained halves of the structure of the same 
political movement. In the following brief analysis the 
particular pattern of industrial legislation over arbit-
ration will be examined first. 
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The pattern of legislation which developed was 
neither common to all colonies, nor in similar form. (1) 
There were two main trends in legislation, that of New 
South vales and South Australia, and a different pattern 
in Victoria. The Victorian system was a type by itself. 
Its distinctive feature was the Wages Board. The pecul-
iar nature of Victorian legislation is explained partly 
by its origin. The primary object of Wages Boards was 
not to forbid strikes and lock-outs, but to suppress 
sweating. Agitation in the press led to a Parliamentary 
Commission (1893) on the Factory and Shops Act of 1890. 
It resulted in a new Factory and Shops Act (1893). This 
Act passed in a period of acute depression established 
\ ages Boards in six specified industries. The Boards 
were empowered to fix minimum rates which were enforced 
by the Minister of Labour through the Chief Inspector of 
Factories. In 1900 a Commission was appointed to inquire 
into the workings of the Wages Boards and of legislation 
of similar States. The Commission reported adversely on 
(1) The following account of the legislation is 
based on: C. M. H. Clark, Select Documents; 
R. N. Ebbels, The Australian Labour Movement 
1850-1907; R. N. Gilchrest, Bulletins of 
Indian Industries and Labour: No. 2 Concili-
ation and Arbitration India, 1922 ; J. T. 
Sutcliffe, A History of Trade Unionism; 
I. Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics; 
R. B. Walk.er, 'Australia's Second Arbitration 
Act', Labour Histat'y, No. 19, 1970. 
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the ~ages Board system and made recommendations on the 
lines of the New Zealand Arbitration Act, but in spite 
of this recommendation the Vages Board Act was re-enacted 
in 1 902. 
The New South Wales Trades Disputes Concilia-
tion and Arbitration Act (1892) was the direct result of 
the unrest of 1890-2. The lesson of the Strike as 
accepted by the Royal Commission was the solution of 
arbitration and conciliation for problems of industrial 
strife. The Report of the Royal Commission on Strikes, 
1891 , re corded, 
" ••• we do not pre tend that a State organisation 
for conciliation and arbitration would, under 
the existing circumstances, be a perfect cure 
for all industrial conflicts, we are of the 
opinion that it would render inestimable service 
in the right direction, and that its establish-
ment should not be delayed." ( 1) 
The Commission secondly made ~he necessary distinction 
between the functions of arbitration and conciliation. 
The conciliatory agency, it stated, is required to get the 
parties to a dispute to come to an agreement voluntarily 
( 1) Report of the Royal Commission on Strikes 
(1891) from R. N. Ebbels, The Australian 
Labour Movement 1850-1907, p. 157 
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(with no opinion on the merits of each side). The func-
tion of arbitration is to determine the merits and to 
give a positive decision to be abided bJ'• (1) Thirdly, 
the Commission recommended: that boards of conciliation 
be constituted on an industry-by-industry or dispute-by-
dispute basis, with a nucleus of a Chairman (a ··overn-
ment nominee), and two colleagues chosen from 'capital' 
and 'labour' respectively. These three would also form 
an arbitration board which could carry out an enquiry 
at the request of one or both parties to the dispute. 
Ther e would be no legal compulsion to secure the perform-
ance of awards. The Act differed from the Report of the 
Royal Commission in three respect s . The most significant 
difference and the reason why the Act was generally of 
little use was that the Council of Arbitration could not 
hold an enquiry unless both sides had previously agreed 
to arbitration. 
The trend towards arbitration and conciliation, 
but still on a voluntary basis, was continued until 1900. 
South Australia passed a Conciliation Act (1904) and ew 
South Wales attempted with the Conciliation and Arbitration 
Act ( 1899) to provide for the settlenent of trade disputes. 
( 1) Report of the Royal Commission on Strikes 
(1891), from c •• H. Clark, Select Documents, 
p. 625. 
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The Act had made further steps in Arbitration; it conferred 
powers of public enquiry upon certain officials, provided 
for the compulsion of witnesses and the right of entry into 
premises for investigation purposes, and made provision 
for the appointment (on the application of both parties) 
of an arbitrator. The Act however contained the major 
'flaw' of Acts in Australia to this date; it was not com-
pulsory. The parties to a dispute were not compelled to 
submit their cases to it, and in practice only three cases 
were submitted under its provisions. 
The trend of arbitration which developed in 
New South Wales led through to the scheme of arbitration 
contained in the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration 
Bill. In New South Wales, in 1901 a compulsory measure, 
the Industrial Arbitration Act, was passed. The chief 
inspiration of this measure was the New Zealand Compulsory 
Act, with its apparent success. (1) The significance of 
the compulsory act of arbitration in relation to the role 
of unions was stressed by N. G. Wise (Attorney-General 
(1) This argument was not accepted without some 
scepticism by the Legislature; " ••• the 
instance of New Zealand ••• is not enough to 
justify us in blindly taking anything upon 
trust in regard to a measure of this sort ••• 
(she) has been experimenting in this direction 
for some five or six years, during the whole 
of which time she has been enjoying singularly 
prosperous seasons • 1' New South Wales Parlia-
mentary Debates, 1900, Vol. 107, pp. 4809-11 
from c. M. H. Clark, Select Documents, p. 639. 
- - - - - -------
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in the Government which passed the Act). Wise described 
to the House the rationale contained in the Bill. The 
basis of his stand was a vision of 'public' desire for 
industrial stability. He described the present situa-
tion as one where trade unions had 'reached the limits 
of their beneficial influence'. He therefore postulated 
that the trade union must be converted into a 'weapon of 
industrial peace', by 
11
••• obtaining from Parliament the power to 
make a collective bargain with an employer, 
which shall not only be binding in honour, 
but wi 11 have behind it a legal sanction ••• 11 ( 1 ) 
Wise included preference in the Bill as the logical step 
to this reasoning, 
( 1) 
( 2) 
"If one admits that tr...e whole foundation of 
the Bill rests on the admission that unionism 
is a necessary protection to the workman, and 
that the method of unionism is by collective 
bargaining - then it follows that you cannot 
have any outside minority of non-unionists 
always cutting av,ay at it and reau cing its 
terms. 11 ( 2) 
New South Wales Parliamentary Debates, 1900, 
Vol. 103, p. 641 et. seq. from C. M. H. Clark, 
Select Documeni§., p. 630. 
Ibid, p. 634. 
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This was the logic of preference to arbitration in cir-
cumstances in which trade unionists could not gain a 
preference by economic compulsion. (1) It was the logic 
repeated by the New Zealand Court which decided in 1900 
that the Act (1894), although it did not contain a 
specific clause, nevertheless gave power to the Court 
to give preference to unionists. (2) It was the logic 
of preference as stated and accepted by a Liberal Party 
member. (3) The test in the Commonwealth Conciliation 
and Arbitration Bill came to rest on the question of 
whether or not the House would accept such a rationale 
f1•om a Labour Unistry. 
(1) Such as exists with unskilled workers in 
circumstances where industries are localised. 
(2) Chief Justice Stout stated in the case of 
Taylor and Oakley v. Mr Justice Edwards and 
Others, "It (preference) abrogates the right 
of workmen and employers to mske their own 
contracts. It in effect, abolishes 'contract' 
and restores 'status'. The only way the Act 
can be rendered inoperative is by workmen not 
associating or not joining any union ••• 11 
from C.P.D. VIII, 2503, quoted by ~r Hughes. 
(3) Section 36 (N. S. V • Act) , "The Court • • • may ••• 
direct that as be tween members of an industrial 
ur-ion of employees and other persons offering 
their labour at the same time, such members 
shall be employed in preference to such other 
persons, other things being equal, and appoint 
a tribunal to finally decide in what cases an 
employer to whom any such direction applies 
may employ a person who is not a member of any 
such union or branch." 
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As :from New South Wales developed the form of' 
arbitration of the Commonwealth Bill, so New South Wales 
produced the germ of the structure of the Parliamentary 
Labour Parties. A factor common to both developments is 
of course the Maritime Strike. Certainly the unions 
considered the alternative of political representation 
in the le ssona of the def'ea t, 
"Another lesson to be learnt from the Strike 
is that it bas demonstrated the need for 
Labour establishing itself in the Parliaments 
of the colonies ••• once let Labour be ade-
quately represented in Legislature ••• and 
the cause of unionism is assured ••• 11 ( 1) 
While it is reasonable to accept this fact as the major 
impetus to political representation,orthodox historical 
opinion generally identifies a 'long-term movement of 
unions placing greater stress on political action ' . (2) 
(1) From the Report of the General Secretary to 
the 5th Conference of the Australasian 
Shearers ' Union, 1891 :from R. N. Ebbels, 
The Australian Labour Movement, p. 153. 
(2) See generally Churchward I ntroduction, R. N. 
Ebbels, The Australian Labour Movement; 
N. B. Nai rn , 1The Rol e of the Tr ades and 
Labour Council i n New South Wal es, 1871 -1891 ' , 
Op. cit; J . E. O'Cormor, 11890 - A Turning 
Point in Labour History: A Reply to Mrs 
Philipps ' , Op. cit. 
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This is not the occasion to comment on the 
wider issue of the establishment of each individual 
Labour Party. (1) For our purposes the primary question 
remains to comment on the establishment of attitudes and 
practices of the developing party. The basic reasoning 
that prompted the particular party structure is reflected 
in the words of James Jupp, 
"Distrust of politicians was a primary motiv-
ation in deserting the liberal-radicals and 
sending 'Labour men' into the colonial parlia-
ments. Disappointment with the legislative 
process as a whole, which later encouraged 
syndicalist attitudes within the unions, was 
bred in Government reaction to the Maritime 
and Shearers' Strikes of 1890. It was over 
twenty years until the Labour representation 
bodies could bind their :i;arliamentarians 
effectively. Yet they found this as necessary 
as had been their initial desertion of the 
Liberals •11 ( 2) 
The key factor is of course in the binding of politicians; 
Labour keeping control over its elected representatives. 
The relation between industrial and political labour lay in 
( 1) 
(2) 
See generally v. G. Childe, How Labour Governs, (1 elbourne, 1964); • N. Ebbels, The Australian 
Labour Movement 1850-1907; J. Jupp, Australian 
Party Politics; P. G. McCarthy, 'Labour and the 
Living Wage 1890-1910', Op. cit; J. T. Sutcliffe, 
History of Trade Unionism; I. Turner, Indust-
rial Labour and Politics; R. B. Walker, 
'Australia's Second Arbitration Act', Op . cit. 
This list by no means covers the amount of 
material available. 
J. Jupp, Australian Party Politics, p. 57. 
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a desire by the unions to have policy carried into the 
legislative sphere. Although the formalization of the 
relationship occurred first in New South Wales it was 
not the result of the Strike. It occurred only after 
a division in the party over free trade in 1893. The 
Labour Electoral League decided to bind its parliament-
arians in taking major decisions in Caucus. It was some 
time before the Electoral Leagues fully asserted their 
right to instruct Caucus; all it did in 1893 was to 
demand the 'pledge' for matters, 
11 
••• affecting the Labour Party, the fate of.' 
the Ministry or calculated to establish a 
monopoly or confer further privileges on the 
already privileged classes." ( 1) 
Many parliamentarians including the leader of the Party, 
George Black, opposed it. Those who did not accept it 
allied themselves with Reid under the leadership of Cook. 
Vith the adoption of a similar form of the pledge in the 
other colonial Labour Parties, Labour became the first 
Australian party organized effectively along Caucus lines. 
This organization necessarily carried into the Commonwealth 
( 1) uoted from Ibid, p. 57. 
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Party. 
The decade saw varying opinions with the Labour 
movement to arbitration and conciliation. The Labour 
movement did not accept the legal enactment of arbitration 
as a lesson of the Strike. The platform of the New South 
Wales Labour Electoral League in 1891 and 1892 made no 
reference to arbitration and conciliation. There is evi-
dence of a feeling that many hoped, with unionism more 
extensively federated, for victory through direct con-
frontation. Wall (Labour) told the New South '{ales 
Legislature in 1902, 
"We shall never be in that position (i.e. no 
strikes) until the trade unions of the 
colonies unite in one great union, and when 
no strikes or call-outs will be allowed unless 
sanctioned by the federal council appointed by 
the federated uni.ens of the colonies ••• what 
we require is an executive body for the 
industrial classes, appointed by themselves, 
unfettered by any laws, and entirely outside 
the legislature. 11 (1) 
R. B. ·ialker suggests that opinion shifted with the 
worsening of economic depression and unemployment. (2) 
The Australian Workers' Union had included arbitration 
( 1) 
(2) 
Quoted from K. F. Walker, Industrial Relations 
in Australia (Massachusetts, 1966), p. 8. 
R. B. Walker, 'Australia's Second Arbitration 
Act', Op. cit., p. 21 •. See page 27, Part II. 
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as an object in 1894, 
"To improve the relations between employers 
and employees, and to settle disputes by means 
of conciliation and arbitration. " (1) 
The relationship between the Labour parties 
and legislation on arbitration is one generally of support 
by Labour. (2) I. Turner states that arbitration was 
argued most fiercely in New South Wales when the Labour 
parties, with substantial parliamentary representation 
held the balance of power. While in Victoria the unions 
were at first satisfied with the ·vages Board they came 
later to favour a Federal Arbitration Act. The Queensland 
unions wanted arbitration but despite the Lib-Lab. coali-
tion in 1893, had little chance of getting it. (3) 
However Labour as a whole did not press for compulsory 
awards until 1898. (4) The character of Labour as des-
cribed by P. G. McCarthy ensured a support from most 
( 1) 'Rules of the Australian vorkers ' Union', from 
c . M. H. Clark, Select Documents, p . 742. 
(2) See R. B. ·alker, 'Australia ' s Second Arbitra-
t i on Ac t' , Op. cit ., p . 17 for a summary of 
arguments. 
(3) I. Turner, I ndustrial Labour and Politics, p. 35. 
(4) R. B. Walker, 'Australia ' s Second Arbitration 
Act ' , Op. cit • , p. 1 7. 
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Labour members in the legislature, 
"Economic and politic al conditions mostly 
dictated the pace and direction of change; 
labour mostly capitalized on opportunities 
as they occurred." ( 1) 
There were clear benefits for Labour in the concept of 
arbitration as described by Vise (note, specifically, 
Wise's concept of arbitration differs from the ~ages 
Board system by being based on explicit recognition of 
collective bargaining to protect the 'community ' interest), 
( 1) 
(2) 
(3) 
"The Act applies to and operates upon organised 
Labour only. The units which it recognised 
are not individuals, but associations, so that 
no one can invite its aid for himself alone, 
but must share with others of his class what-
ever benefits he may receive." (2) (3) 
P. G. McCarthy, The Harvester Judgment: An 
Historical Assessment, Vols. I and II (Ph.d 
thesis held by the Australian National Univer-
si ty , p • 201 • 
R. B. ·vise, 'The Industrial Arbitration Act 
of New South Wales' (from Attorney-General's 
files), p. 3. 
The thesis does not extend to discussing a 
correlation between the establishment of 
industrial tribunals and the expansion of 
union numbers. The latest work, by P. G. 
McCarthy, suggests that union strength between 
1890 and 1910, depended more on economic cir-
cumstances than on the fact of arbitration. 
See P. G. McCarthy, 'Labour and the Living Yage 
1890-191 O', Op. cit. 
ill 
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P.ART IV PARTY 
UNIONIS AS TESTED BY THE 
PREFERENTIAL PRiiCIPLE CONTAINED 
IN THE cm. ON\'VEALTH CONCILIATION 
AND ARBITRATION BILL 1903-4 
(i) "Industry ••• is unfortunately the shuttlecock 
of Australian politics ." 
Interview with 
[r o. C. Beale, Age, 28 June 1904 
The duty of providing legal enactment of the 
principle of arbitration and conciliation was transferred 
to the first parliaments of the Commonwealth by the 
Constitution. (1) The Federal Constitution reads in 
part: 
"51 • 
(xxxv) 
The Parliament shall, subject to this 
Constitution, have power to make laws 
for the peace, order, and good govern-
ment of the Commonwealth with respect 
to:-
Conciliation and Arbitration for the 
prevention and settlement of indust-
rial disputes extending beyond the 
limits of any one state ••• " (2) 
(1) For an account of the proposal at the Federal 
Convention in 1891, and its acceptance at the 
1897-8 Convention, see 1. F. Crisp, Australian 
National Government, p. 24. 
(2) Ibid, p. 79. 
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Yet this duty described so simply in the Constitution was 
translated into a situation described by Henry Gyles 
Turner of Victoria, 
"No legislation, with the exception of the 
Tariff, has ever produced anything like the 
mass of heated discussion. It wrecked three 
ministries; it embittered the relations of 
parties in Parliament; it evoked the antagon-
ism of the States ••• " (1) 
The major motif of the debates that is suggested is of 
conflict between parties. 
The major conflict of the Bill did not blossom 
until consideration of Clause 48, although the back-
ground to our problem includes the resignation of a 
Liberal member from his party and then of the Liberal 
party itself. There were difficulties in the initial 
readings of the Bill; a fortnight after the leave to 
introduce the Bill had been grantecJ,Kingston, the Liberal 
member responsible for drafting the Bill resigned (21 
June 1903). He did so because the Government refused 
to yield to his demand to include a clause relating to 
(1) H. G. Turner, The First Decade of the Australian 
Commonwealth: A Chronicle of Contem orar 
Poli tics 1901-1910 Melbourne, 1 911 , p. 73. 
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ship ing. (1) The charge of the Bill passed to A. eakin 
(Prime !, ini ster) , who moved the second reading on 30 July 
1903. Deakin's speech stressed the possibility of the 
Bill in terms of the significance of social legislation, 
11 
~o measure ever submitted to any legislatuPe 
offers greater prospects of the establishment 
of social justice and of the removal of 
inequalities than those which are based upon 
the principle of conciliation and arbitration. 11 (2) 
There was little conflict over the general principle of 
the Bill, as described by Dea..'l{in. The exception was .1r 
Bruce Smith (Conservative) who denounced the Bill in terms 
of interference and regulation of daily conduct. (3) 
There was a degree of fault-finding however. Some 
speakers were doubtful of the present necessity, some 
that the Bill aimed at 'poaching' on State rights and 
some that it did not go far enough. 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
(3) 
Kingston claimed that an award under the 
Arbitration Court (to be constituted by the 
Bill) should not only be what is called a 
'common rule' , i.e. a rule which would bind 
persons similarly placed, who were not parties 
to the cause before the Court, but he desired 
to make it apply to all British and foreign 
shipping engaged in the coastal trade. 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (hereafter 
C.P.D.), XV, 2826, 30 July 1903. 
Ibid, 3448. 
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The major source of conflict was not centred 
on the third clause even though it lead to the resig-
nation of Deakin and the Liberal Party on 22 April 1904. 
The third clause was introduced on the 8 September 1903 
and it provided that the Bill should not include the 
Public Servants of the Commonwealth or a State. Mr A. 
Fisher (Labour) moved the deletion of the word 'not'; 
he was rejected by a majority of seven. Mr [cDonald 
(Labour) moved that the following words be added to the 
clause, 
"Except that it shall apply to the railway 
servants of any state." (1) 
The Liberals were adamant that no Public Servants be 
included. The crisis was not resolved. The remainder 
of the second session of the first parliament was con-
cerned with administrative work. By the Second Parlia-
ment, Labour reaffirmed its decision to insist at least 
on the inclusion of railway servants. (2) On 21 iarch 
1904 Fisher moved an amendment to include the Public 
Service of the States and Commonwealth in the Bill. 
(1) Labour was preoccupied with this particular 
question because of the bitter feeling aroused 
in Victoria by a recent unsuccessful strike of 
railway servants. 
(2) Argus, 9 March 1904. 
--- -----
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Deakin was adamant, 
"Nothing can be gained, commensurate with the 
inquiry that would be done if we allowed the 
operations of one of these Governments to 
infringe upon those of another ••• 11 (1) 
and on the acceptance of Fisher's amendment resigned on 
27 April 1904. He insisted that ~r \ atson take o~fice. (2) 
The problem of the implications of including 
preference to unionists rests on a clear understanding 
of the implications of preference to unionists. The 
problem was at the broadest level that of defining the 
status and role of trade unions in relation to the work-
ings of the Act. The decision to rest 'the whole found-
ation of the Bill' on the trade unions was not univer-
sally desired. A Memorandum as to Industrial Conciliation 
and Arbitration to be laid before the Federal Government 
on behalf of Employers in Victoria on the 24th June, 1901, 
stated, 
"The Wages Board System of Victoi-•ia is entirely 
separated from trades unionism ••• Employers 
are satisfied that in t_is particular the 
Wages Board System in Victoria is infinitely 
to be preferred to the unionist principles of 
(1) C.P.D. XVIII, 787, 21 arch 1904. 
(2) The crisis was resolved under Labour by the 
amendment that Railway Servants be included 
under the Act, being accepted by the House. 
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the New Zealand Arbitration Law. They cannot 
accept an Arbitration Court Bill at any price 
unless it is entirely separated f'rom unionism." (1) 
Clause 48 completed the synthesis of' the status of' trade 
unions and the workings of arbitration, 
"The Court by its award, or by order made on 
the application of' any party to the proceed-
ings before it, at any time in the period 
during which the award is binding may -
(a) ••• (ref'ers to the minimum wage) 
(b) direct that as between members of organ-
izations of employers or employees and 
other persons of'fering or desiring service 
or employment at the same time, preference 
will be given to such members, other things 
being equal; and 
(c) appoint a tribunal to finally decide in 
what cases an employer or employee to whom 
any such direction applies may employ or 
be employed by a person who is not a 
member of' any such organization. 11 ( 2) 
The principle of possible pre.ference for some 
unions evoked a complex range of' attitudes about the 
nature and status of unions both in debate and in the 
daily press. The debates in a sense evolved. They began 
with an initial questioning by some members of the justi-
(1) A Memorandum as to Industrial Conciliation 
and Arbitration to be laid bef'ore the 
Federal Government CULbehalf of Employers 
in Victoria on the 21 th June 1 01, p. G: 
The emorandum is to be found in the Attorney 
General's file on the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Bill, 1904.) 
(2) C.P.D. VIII, 2493, 21 June 1904. 
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fication for preference, 
"I believe in the principle of equal liberty 
and justice; and non-unionists, who constitute 
the vast majority of workers in Australia, 
have, at least, as much right to be considered 
as have members of unions. 11 (1) 
The problem of giving existing organizations a protected 
status had however implications beyond the workings of 
the Act. The discussion of Clause 48 although technically 
on the problem of the preference principle did also see 
an evolution whereby members saw the unions as an inher-
ant part of the Labour Party, 
"This is a matter of a creating of constitu-
encies." (2)(3) 
They attempted therefore (in Clause 62) to confine the 
role of the trade unions to the operation of the Act 
demanding that they become economic institutions with no 
political status. (4) The Daily Telegraph viewed this 
evolution as one of a gradual finding out of the implic-
( 1) 
( 2) 
(3) 
(4) 
C.P.D. VIII, 2499, 21 June. 
Ibid, 2451 • 
Clause 48 is specifically discussed in 
Sections (ii), (iii), (iv) of Part IV. 
Clause 62 is discussed in Section (v) 
of Part IV. 
~------------------ -- --
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ations of the Bill, 
"Under the specious guise of a measure for pre-
serving the industrial peace where large public 
interests were affected, it first presented 
itself to them as a laudable attempt at prac-
tical humanitarian legislation ••• But as the 
purposes of the bill became more clearly 
understood it is found to be not nearly so 
innocent as represented, and to carry under 
the cloak of inaustrial peace a concealed 
weapon of political war." (1) 
The debates on the preference clause ultimately evolved 
into the pure form of a political struggle, whereby 
Labour attempted to recommit Clause 48 in circumstances 
in which the merits of preference could not be discussed. (2) 
(ii) "We are attempting by using the machinery of 
unions and by taking advantage of the efforts 
of unionists to do something that will benefit 
not only unionists but every person engaged in 
an ind us try." 
Carpenter (Labour), C.P.D. VIII, 
2508. 
Labour members saw the trade unions as the 
natural bodies to :function within the terms of the Act. 
(1) Daily Telegraph (hereaf'ter D.T.), 1 July 1904. 
(2) See Section (vi) of Part IV. 
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They attempted throughout the debates to show (in Hughes' 
phrase) how, 
11 
••• preference to unionists, is of the ver;sr 
essence and natm~e of such a piece of egis-
lation. tt ( 1) 
·willia.m Morris Hughes {}linister for External Affairs) 
began the defence of Labour support for preference. On 
21 June 1904, following the introduction of Clause 48, 
the circumstances of the debates were determined by w. 
Johnson's (Conservative) motion, 
11 That paragraph b and c be left out." (2) 
Such paragraphs, he stated, infringed the 'right of free 
choice' and denied the 'right of individual liberty'. (3) 
Hughes drew the attention of the Legislature to the 
position of the unions in relation to arbitration, specif-
ically their loss of earlier privileges and the necessity 
of preference to compensate. The particular loss of 
privileges Hughes refers to is the power of striking and 
refusing to work with non-unionists; both are removed 
by the Bill. The failure to provide for preference would 
not only mean that the Bill ' will be the worst ( thing) 
(1) C.P.D. VIII, 2502, 21 June. 
(2) Ibid, 2497. See page 56. 
(3) Ibid, 2497. 
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in the world for unions', because if they defeat an 
employer in a case he could thereafter refuse to employ 
unionists, but for this reason the Act will fail to 
operate. The unions caught in this situation would not 
have the incentive to bring a ca.se before the Court. 
Hughes reminded members of the terrors of the 1890 
industrial conflict and he stated, (they) 
11 
••• propose to take away the solitary motive 
(preference) for putting this measure when 
it becomes law into force." (1) 
A similar approach in debate was made by W. 
G. Spence (President of the Australian Workers ' Union). 
His aim, 
''I wish to put the position fairly, and to 
justify the action of the Government in 
retaining this clause." (2) 
was an attempt to relate preference to the difficulty 
of existing conditions. The problem that he highlighted 
was the 'black-list' system which he stated was carried 
on by the Pastora.lists' Union. Spence postulated that 
(1) Ibid, 2615, 23 June 1904. 
(2) Ibid, 2615. 
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by numbering references for future employers with a number 
that appeared on a master list of known unionists, the 
next employer would, solely on this basis, refuse the 
shearer work. The outline of this particular problem 
was Spence's contribution in an attempt to have members 
appreciate the union difficulty, 
"I am spea.king from a full knowledge of the 
way in which the boycott is worked against 
unionists. This is our justification for 
asking for the enactment of this clause." ( 1) 
There were two major alternatives suggested 
by opposition members. They were firstly by-passing 
the trade unions and seconc.ly changing the existing 
form. A scheme of by-passing the trade unions was made 
by D. Thompson. He stated that while Watson (Prime 
Minister) thinks it is i mpractical to use all employers 
and that trade unions were a necessary substitute, 
"I am pointing out that ••• it is possible 
to accomplish what is desired more readily 
and easily by recognising all the employees 
in an industry as an organization on the 
one side and all the employers on the other." (2) 
Labour members stressed the importance of the trade 
unions in this sort of legislation because of their 
( 1 ) Ibid, 261 9. 
(2) Ibid, 2545, 22 June. 
cohesion. 
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atson stated, 
" ••• that such legislation ••• could not have 
been as successful as it has been, except for 
the fact that it is not founded on a skeleton 
organisation or a chance working together of 
a number of disunited individuals, but that 
unions exist which are made responsible under 
the law - unions of men combined in one body, 
by ties of sentiment and loyalty one to 
another • 11 ( 1 ) 
Samual Mauger affirmed that it was his experience of the 
Factory Acts in Victoria that they are most effective 
when backed by 11 strong, active, vigilant trade unions." (2) 
This proposal to by-pass unions, which Spence called 
'compulsory unionism' never became a serious issue in 
the debates. (3) It remained secondary to the major 
problem of all debates, dispute with the existing form 
of unions. E. Lonsdale introduced the problem; he would 
not, he stated, object to preference, 
" ••• if the organizations V1ere to be kept 
entirely free from all political matters . 11 (4) 
Labour's response was that men cannot be compelled to 
(1) Ibid, 2570. 
(2) Ibid, 2577. 
(3) Ibid, 2620, 23 June 1904. 
(4) Ibid, 2518, 21 June 1904. 
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vote in any particular direction (1), while opposition 
members pointed to instances where union rules were 
political and where money was given by unions to a 
political organization. (2) The major discussion on 
this question, the separating of unions organized for 
indust1•ial purposes and unions organized for political 
purposes, which grew of the discussion on Clause 48, was 
not fully examined until discussion on Clause 62, begin-
ning 28 June 1904. 
The primary question of a general as compared 
to a modified preference was the first major defeat for 
the Labour Party. On the third (consecutive) day of 
debate on the Preferential Clause, 23 June, J. W. McCay 
moved that the following proviso be added to paragraph 
b, 
11Wi th the consent of such organizations and 
persons as in the opinion of the court 
represent a majority of those to be affected 
by the award and who have interests in common 
with the party or parties applying for the 
direction ••• 11 (3) 
This amendment was accepted on the following day by a 
majority of 2 7 to 22. Vatson felt that this amendment 
( 1) Ibid, 251 9. 
(2) Ibid , 2518; 2629 , 23 June 1904. 
(3) Ibid, 2635. 
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jeopardised preference; he asked the Chairman to report 
progress and told the House, 
"I feel that this (the amendment) cuts right 
into the heart of' this provision." (1) 
Opinion within the whole labour movement endorsed the 
importance of preference to the movement. The Bendigo 
branch of the Political Labour League was recorded in 
the Age as stating 'that such injustice', the deprivation 
or refusal of employment to unionists, 
11 can only be prevented or minimised by 
preference being given to unionists. 11 (2) 
The resolution of one union accorded t o Watson's decision 
over modification of preference. The New South Wales 
Typographical Association stated, 
11 
••• that the Federal .Arbitration Bill as at 
present amended, - especially by the restric-
tions placed on the preference of employment 
for unionists, - is destructive to industrial 
and political progress, and that it is desir-
able to lose the Bill rather than accept it 
in its present form." (3) 
(1) Ibid, 2690. 
(2) Age, 28 June 1904. 
(3) New South 1ales Typographical .Association 
(est. 1880), 3 December 1904. 
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ratson decided to leave the amend ent and attempt to ask 
the Committee to reconsider the position at the recommit-
tal stage. 
(iii) "It appears to me that, instead of discussing 
the paragraph befare the Committee with a view 
to improving the Bill, many honourable members 
have used it for party political purposes." 
Chanter, C.P.D. VIII, 2638. 
This statement by Chanter is naive in view of 
the complete schism within the Legislature in attitudes 
to arbitration and conciliation. Few of the Conservative 
Party admitted to having no sympathy with the aim of the 
Bill although Johnson stated, 
"I confess that I have no particular faith in 
the efficacy of legislation of this kind as 
a means of securing any permanent improvement 
in industrial conditions ••• n ( 1 ) 
However no Conservative member was a ' believer in trades 
unionism ' ; they did not be ieve in the ef ficacy of 
unions and theref or·e lacked any common ground on the 
question of preference with the Labour Party. (2) 
(1) C.P.D. VIII, 2498, 21 June. 
(2) Ibid, 2515 (Wilks). 
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The Conservatives attempted to undermine the 
principle of preference to unionists. They followed the 
concept that preference was contrary to personal liberty 
(Johnson ' s speech moving his amendment to Clause 48) 
with the specific reason that preference is geared against 
the non-unionist in getting and keeping employment, 
"••• a principle which strikes at the individual 
liberty of the subject, gives a wicked and un-
just preference to one class, makes it more 
difficult for another class to earn its living, 
and is not founded on justice or equity." (1) 
Members postulated that in the practical circunstance 
the principle of preference was unjust. Willis stated 
that preference meant, 
"••• unless men Join unions, the bread will be 
taken out of the moutls of their children, 
and under such tyranny, they must inevitably 
yield." ( 2) 
Johnson further accused unions of having a tendency to 
be exclusive. He referred to a circular of the Federated 
Sawmill and Timberyards Employees' Association to its 
members, 
"(2) That all members ov1ing more than two 
quarters be struck off the books, and 
henceforth treated as non-unionists. 11 (3) 
(1) Ibid, 2564, 22 June. 
(2) Ibid, 2628, 23 June. 
(3) Ibid, 2500, 2501, 21 June. 
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and also the case before the New South Vales Arbitration 
Court in which the Sydney Wharf Labourers' Union refused 
to admit three waterside workers to membership. (1) 
Conservative members denounced the circum-
stances of this kind of legislation. They accused Labour 
Party members and others of the ' ,i! inisterial side ' as, 
"class representatives, who advocate class legislation." (2) 
They viewed the basis and the beginning of the threat of 
the 'class element' in politics in the circumstances of 
new unionism. 7. H. Kelly stated he did not object to 
'genuine' trade unionism which attempted to abolish 
sweating and gain fair terms for employees but, 
11 
••• there is another form of' unionism of' much 
later grov'th than genuine trade unionism, 
which makes for industrial warfare, not for 
industrial peace ••• 11 (3) 
This point of view ref'lects the impact on political 
thinking of the special circumstances of the new 'unionism', 
particularly the effect of the cohesive ideology and 
(1) Ibid, 2501. Labour admitted the validity of 
this second criticism and Hughes told the House 
that \'· atson proposed to inser t a clause pro-
viding that the rules of unions be submitted 
to the Registrar, and be of such a character 
as would permit the entrance of any qualified 
person. 
(2) Ibid, 2627. 
(3) Ibid, 2517. 
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response to the Maritime Strike which gave the unions a 
political aura. It was in these terms that the Conservative 
members viewed the whole structure of the Labour movement, 
and specifically the intentions of the Labour Party. 
Dugald Thompson asked the Labour Party if in the circum-
stances, 
" ••• would the Government support the proposal 
to force workmen to join a declared active 
political body to whose principles they were 
absolutely opposed?" (1) 
In the circumstances the Conservative Party supported 
every amendment to limit the operation of preference or 
to change the nature of unionism. They never however 
managed to gain the support of the Liberals for an extreme 
amendment; such as that by Johnson directing that para-
graphs band c be omitted, which rephrased was defeated 
by 11 votes. (2) 
There was also a similar Conservative assault 
on the House by means of petitions. The four petitions 
received were each from employers ' associations. They 
( 1) Ibid, 2541. 
(2) Ibid, 2541. Johnson amended his amendment, 
and although it had the same effect it was 
confined to the omission of the words "direct 
tha t 11 at the beginning of paragraph b. The 
object he stated was 'to allow a test vote 
to be taken upon the question of omitting the 
whole of paragraphs b and c.' 
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generally exhibited the same theme as that f'rom, 
11 
••• that in the interest of employees and 
employers in the producing, trading, indust-
rial, and commercial world, the House will 
not pass the c. and A. Bill." (1) 
The other three petitions asked respectively : for a 
Royal Commission on the eff'ects of arbitration and concil-
iation, that the House did no t pass the Bill, and denounced 
the Bill from the point of view of those who did not want 
to become unionists. (2) The petitions have been included 
as part of the Conservative assessment of unionism and 
conciliati on and arbitration. While the data used in 
this dissertation does not extend to establishing a corre-
lation between the Conservative Party and the employers 
of Australia, it seems reasonable to assume however that 
the party (at least in this type of legislation) reflected 
the views of the business community. 
(1) Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers (Journals 
of the Senate: Votes and Proceedings of the 
House of Representatives; Reports, Accounts 
and Papers) , Vol. I, elbourne, p. 41 • 
(Petition from Brisbane Chamber of Manufacturers). 
(2) Ibid, p. 253 (from Conference of Master Bakers 
of Australia), p. 26 (from the Central Counc il 
of Employers of Australia),~· 39 (from the 
Pastoralists Federal Council). 
(iv) 
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11 
••• but when it splits upon this point must 
you not take sides with one wing or the other, 
your vote will almost certainly determine the 
result ••• " 
:ise to Deakin, 24 :1ay 1904, 
Deakin Correspondence. 
The Liberal Party lacked the essential homogen-
eity of the Labour Party, and probably of the Conservatives 
as well. ~ith phrases such as the folloring by Watson, 
111 am inclined to doubt that statement. I have 
had a very long experience • • • of trade unions." 
and w. H. Carpenter, 
"••• speaking as a practical unionist ••• " 
Labour members were explicit about the basis of their 
understanding of the problem of preference. (1) The 
Liberals however were deeply divided, and they formed 
the key to the political situation. In the months follow-
ing Deakin ' s resignation, both Conservatives and Labour 
vied for an alliance with the Liberals. G. H. Reid 
attempted a coalition with Deakin which was not accepted. 
Reid ' s attitude and actions during this period were 
closely followed by the four major newspapers. They 
recorded both his e:f'forts at coalition and failing this 
(1) Ibid, 2570, 2508. 
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his f'requently expected 'no-confidence' motion. (1) The 
Federal Labour Party Caucus Jinutes of May 1904 record 
a motion (from Carpenter) that, 
"he (the Chairman ) be empowered to negotiate 
towards an alliance." (2) 
The Caucus Hee ting of 26 viay records that the motion was 
carried 24-8. (3) Although Watson wrote to Deakin offer-
ing alliance and setting out the conditions, the offer 
was not accepted, 
nAt a meeting of the Liberal Party today it 
was resolved that present circumstances do 
not render advisable either of the proposed 
alliances or conditions. 
(Signed) A. Deakin11 (4) 
The ·[orning Post Letters record the hesitation of Deakin 
in this matter, 
( 1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
11 
• • • since in either case it must see old 
colleagues and supporters driven into direct 
See Age, 19 April, 25 May, 2 June, 4 June; 
Argus, 20 [ay, 24 ~ay, 4 June, 8 June ; D. T. , 
1 0 May, 20 ay, 23 [ay, 25 May; Sydney Morning 
Herald (hereafter S. [ .H.) , 10 Jay, 11 11ay, 23 
I· ay, 6 June • 
• inutes of the Federal Parliamentary Labour 
Party (hereafter Caucus 1 inutes), 1 7 · ay 1904. 
Caucus Minutes, 26 Uay 1904. 
Ibid, 26 May 1904. 
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opposition. u ( 1) 
The Liberal attitude towards the Bill was also significant 
because it remained essentially the product of the Liberal 
administration, 
uThe bill is not that of this Ministry at all, 
but of the late one. It does not represent 
the ideas of the Labour Party on the subject 
of arbitration." (2) 
However the Labour Party omitted nine clauses, inserted 
three new ones and altered others; Clause 48 was not 
affected. 
The Liberals in debate exhibited a characteris-
tic predicted by the Sydney Morning Herald, at the end of 
lay, 
"••• the two wings of the Deakin party will 
gradually drift away from each other until 
they definitely range themselves upon the 
side of the Opposition or the Government." (3) 
A core of Liberals demanded a modification of the Labour 
position. They were responsible for the amendments 
(1) , orning Post (London) f:24 lay.:J, 23 July 1904, 
from J. A. La Nauze, Alfred Deakin a Biography 
Vol. 2 (.elbourne, 1965), p. 371. 
(2) S., .H., 30 May 1904. 
(3) Ibid, 30 Uay. 
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which thrice defeated Labour. These Liberals were of 
the opinion of Ewing, 
11 
••• I feel that the general opinion of arbi t-
ration is a good one. That the principle is 
a sound one is incontrovertible; but many of 
us feel that the Government has gone altogether 
too far in this proposal. 11 (1) 
They subsequently assaulted Labour's position from two 
directions. P. Glynn stated on the first day of debate 
on the question (i.e. 21 June) that he intended to sub-
mit an amendment limiting the power or preference. He 
postulated that ' the Clause ••• is not essential to the 
Bill', because with the minimum wage provision non-unionists 
could not undermine the union position by working for less 
than the minimum wage or more than the maximum hours. (2 ) 
Other Liberals did not however accept such an extreme 
point of view but rather followed up the question, which 
Glynn had earlier thrown out, 
11 But why allow the question to be imported 
into every dispute or which that is not the 
subject?" (3) 
Hence McCay forwarded his amendment limiting preference 
(1) C.P.D. VIII, 2547, 22 June. 
(2) Ibid, 25 73. 
(3) Ibid, 2513, 21 June. 
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to a situation where a majority wanted it. (1) 
The second modification concerned the implic-
ations of giving political institutions a favoured 
economic circumstance; 
"I should certainly not have so much objection 
to it if the organizations were to be kept 
entirely free from all political matters.n (2) 
On this point many Liberals were completely sympathetic 
to the Conservatives although they denied hostility to 
unionism per se , 
11 I deny absolutely," 
stated 1cCay, 
11 
••• the statement that any man who criticises 
this clause adversely is therefore hostile to 
trades unionism.u (3) 
They similarly attacked preference from the viewpoint of: 
unfairness to the majority of workers (non-unionists), 
and personal liberty. (4) 
( 1 ) See page 53. 
(2) C.P.D. VIII, 2518. (Lonsdale). 
(3) Ibid, 2631 , 23 J une. 
(4) Ibid, 2631, 2573. 
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They did not avoid mentioning what was in fact the major 
issue underlying all debate; not the adjustment of 
relations among workers but the wider implication, 
were, 
111 r utchinson 
Mr Ewing 
- Unionists would not do all 
the work. 
- No, they can onlf do all the 
legislating." ( 1 ) 
Not all Liberals, in the words of one Liberal, 
11 
••• prepared to seize upon this directory 
provision (preference) to destroy the measure, 11 
but some like Chanter continued, 
11
••• to support the Bill to which I have 
previously given my support." (2) 
Two members who sup orted the Labour position, Isaac 
Isaacs and Sir John Quick did so for reasons that were 
not political and hence not related to party manoeuvring. 
They accorded to a description included in a letter from 
Wise to Deakin; in one Vling of the party he recognised 
( 1 ) lb id , 254 7, 2 2 June • 
(2) Ibid, 2684, 24 June. 
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the 'legal Liberal'. (1) They professed to consider 
primarily the rationale of the whole Bill, that for the 
11 
••• interest of the community at large ••• 
industrial strife should be ended • 11 ( 2) 
They were asserting the goal o-:f "the greatest good for 
the greatest number". (3) Their attitude to unionism 
was determined by its being secondary to the primary end 
of the Bill itself, which said Isaac Isaacs, 
11 
••• is built upon the structure of' organ-
ization.n (4) 
In dealing with the problem of personal freedom they 
maintained a legalistic approach, seeing that the trust-
ing to the Arbitration Court, was in accord with the 
trusting of ' our lives' to the Court generally, 
11 
• • • if we trust the Gour t with our lives and 
our liberties and this is part of the life 
and liberty of the industrial community.u (5) 
( 1) Wise to A. Deakin, 2 June 1904, Deakin Corres-
pondence. The term ' legal Liberal' I am using 
in the sense of being concerned with issues as 
they affect legislation not in being members 
of tb~ lega profession which included Glynn, 
icCay and Deakin. 
(2) C.P.D. VIII, 2 1 • 
3) Ibid, 2663. 
(4) Ibid, 2642. 
(5) Ibid, 2641. 
'------------------------ -·----------- ------ ------- --- ·- -----
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The question of ' political unionism ' was perceived by 
the ' legal Liberal ' in an interesting way. Sir John 
Quick's grasp of the implications of the 'new unionism' 
was expressed in terms of historical inevitability in 
line with the development of unions up to 1904, 
'
1I do not see hm unions could be prevented 
from becoming political organizations. Ve 
must recognise the irresistable pressure and 
tendency of the times in the direction of 
trade union organizations. That tendency is 
an irresistable force, and the only course 
is to regulate that force in proper and safe 
channels. ' ( 1) 
This statement constitutes a reminder of the possible 
gap between actual circumstance and legislation. The 
political manoeuvring about the principle of the Bill 
and the facts of that principle was a phenomena separate 
from the fact of the actual organizat ion of industrial 
power. (2) 
Deakin in speaking about the problems related 
to Clause 48 attempted also to maintain a legal approach. 
In coping with the implications of unionism, he differ-
entiated between organisations ( the term used in the Bill) 
and trade unions. He admitted however that the Clause 
would almost certainly apply to trade unions. (3) 
( 1 ) Ibid , 2 66 6 • 
(2) See Conclusion Part v. 
(3) C.P.D. VIII, 2511. 
- - - - - - - - ---------'---~ 
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However in the practical situation he maintained, 
11 
••• we have nothing to do with unions; no man 
can be forced into a union under this Bill.u (1) 
He trusted also to the Court's exercise of power, 
11 
••• when equity and good conscience demand 
••• 11 (2) 
Deakin's position in relation to the problem 
of the two wings of his party was extremely difficult. 
His personal correspondence reflects an assault from two 
directions. vise wrote to Deakin concerned primarily 
with the problem of legislation, 
11 1 am sorry to see hov1 very loosely the ideas 
which underlie the principle of industrial 
arbitration are held, even by friends of the 
measure. 11 (3) 
lcCay's limitation, he stated, will, 
11 malce the power to grant preference quite 
illusionary • 11 (4) 
There was a confusion of issues however whereby attitudes 
towards parties other than the Liberal Party di not 
(1) Ibid, 2513. 
(2) Ibid, 2513. 
(3) Wise to A. Deakin, 29 June 1904, Deakin 
Corr es ondence. 
(4) Ibid, unaated. 
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necessarily correlate with attitudes about the problem 
of arbitration. (1) T. R. Bavin (judge in Victoria) 
wrote to Deakin stating that, 
11 
••• under the circumstances (he would) rather 
see Watson stay where he is ••• " (2) 
Yet on 15 August, he admitted, 
"I dislike very strongly their proposal of 
preference to unionists •• , 11 
but he remained concerned with the party situation afraid 
that Reid, 11 could come out on top." (3) J. T. Carruthers 
(Premier of New South .. ales) wrote to Deakin inequivoc-
ably II o osed to Caucus in politics". (4) 
(1) This statement has reference to the division 
in the House on the fiscal question. There 
is no space in this dissertation to include 
assessment of the free trade/protectionist 
division. See generally A. Deakin, Federated 
Auetralia (Melbourne 1968); R. Gollan, Radical 
sind \ ·or king Class Poli tics; La Nauze, .Alfred 
Deakin, Vols I and II; I. Turner, Industrial 
Labour and Politics. 
(2) T. R. Bavin to A. Deakin, 9 June 1904, eakin 
Correspondence. 
(3) Ibid, 15 .August 1904. 
(4) J. T. Carruthers to A. Deakin, 1 ay 1904, 
Deakin Correspondence. 
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He was prepared to sacrifice Reid for this aim, 
11 
• • • if you fall into line , not with Reid, but 
with the fight for a Liberal versus a Labour-
Socialist Policy, then our State party will 
go with the Federal Party too • 11 ( 1) 
The test case for Deakin and the Liberals came a few days 
later. 
(v) 11 Some years ago the trade unions were told that 
their members had no right to strike; that a 
strike was practically an act of civil war, 
which brought disaster upon the whole community. 
Our proper cause it was said, was to endeavour 
to redress our grievances by constitution of 
methods , by sending men into Parliament to 
represent our views. But directly the trades 
unions became political organizations, they 
encountered the enmity of the capitalists and 
their satellites ••• n 
Mr acDonald, C.P.D. XIII, 2805. 
The debates on Clause 48 had led (in a phrase 
used by the Age) to the examination of preference as a 
"two edges sword". (2) The first ' edge ' as it were, the 
problem of 'civil disabilities upon men outside' had, 
for the time being, been shelved. (3) The second 'edge', 
(1) Ibid, 28 June 1904. 
(2) Age, 27 June 1904. 
(3) D.T., 24 June 1904; see page 55 for suspension 
of Clause 48 by recommittal. 
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the political rights of unions, was isolated on 28 June. 
Glynn moved an amendment to Clause 62 which was concerned 
with defining the conditions under which organizations 
could be registered with the Arbitration and Conciliation 
Court. His amendment drastically modi fied the form of 
the organizations, 
"Provided that no association shal be regis-
tered 
1. Unless it has been formed , and exists 
solely for the purposes of this Act; or 
2. Whose funds may be applied to purposes 
other than the purposes of this Act; or 
3. Except in respect of the district within 
which the place of employment is situate." (1) 
Glynn a few minutes later asked the Committee to deal 
with the amendment , paragraph by paragraph, so tha:t on y 
paragraph one stood before the T ouse. The amendment 
combined the question of the political status of unions 
and their role in relation to the Act. 
Glynn ' s amendment was of enormous significance 
in this the second stage, as it were, of debate about 
preference, because it was the mould in which debate 
was formed. ··ihile the Argus called tbe amendment, 
11 
••• a va.luab e test of motives, 11 
(1) C.P.D. VI II, 2723 , 28 June. 
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it led away from legis ative problems of providing for 
conciliation and arbitration and instead substituted a 
coni'rontation about the nature of the Labour Party. (1) 
The problem of preference had formal y becor.1e the prob-
lem of the wider significance, the Argu~ stated, 
"The purpose of the political leaders of the 
Labour Party un oubtedly is to use legis-
lation as a means of compulsaril;,r increasing 
the membership of the unions, but for politi-
cal purposes mainly." (2) 
Thus while t..r1e amendment appeared simply to raise and 
make a test case over the question of the political rights 
of unions in relation to the Act, in reality it raised 
the question of Government by Caucus. In the terms of 
the phrasing of the amendment there was no compromise 
possible. 
Outside the House, two major sources of opinion 
reflected the lack of possible compromise on this question; 
they were the daily press and the trade unions themselves. 
The trade unions generally reflecte an abhorrence of such 
a principle. The Labourers ' Protective Society (Sydney) 
( 1) Argus, 30 June 1904. 
(2) Ibid, 22 June 1904. 
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conveyed to Caucus the resolution, 
11 That it is desirable rather to lose the Federal 
Arbitration il than to accept an Act ~hich 
refused preference to Unionists i n cases where 
unions have pol itical objects. u ( 1) 
The Operative Stone ,iasons ' Society ""roolachia, N.s.Y:.) 
endorsed this opinion to Caucus, that it was better to 
lose the Bill than accept one which refused preference 
where unions have political objects. (2) The Hairdressers ' 
and ~igmakers ' Empl oyees ' Union (Sydney) was perhaps under-
stating the importance of political status to unions when 
it resolved, 
11 That any Arbitration Act containing a clause 
not giving preference to unions whose rules or 
decisions deal with politics is detrimental 
to the best interests of trade unionism." (3) 
The press on the other hand appears to have 
welcomed the isolation of the crisis for in some cases 
it 1as used to climax a campaign of hostility about 
Labour rule. The campaign over the Labour administration 
( 1 ) Caucus . inu te s , 30 ovember 1 904. 
(2) I b i d , 30 November 1904. Although t hese resol -
utions apply to a later amendment which more 
specifically connected political status of 
unions and preference I think they reflected 
the general pressure from unions to preserve 
their political status at all costs (even to 
the loss of the Bil l). 
(3 ) I b id , 30 November 1904. 
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and all that this implied, had come mainly from the Argus, 
but the Sydney .rorning Herald and the Daily Telegraph 
had occasionally taken a similar stand. On the broadest 
level the Argus denounced the structure of the Labour 
movement, 
"These office-bearers have become a c l ass by 
themselves, and by co-operating together they 
have converted unionism into a political 
machine, which among other things returns 
union of'fice-bearers to Parliament." ( 1) 
It denounced also the application of this ' party struc-
ture' to legislation. Such a structure it postulated 
iould not care about the broad facts or the general bear-
ing of law on the community but provide solely, 
"••• that it harmonises with ' Caucus ' doctrines 
and favours the single class for which he 
(v·atson) acts and to which he owes his poli ti-
cal being? 11 ( 2) 
The Argus thus endorsed specif ically Glynn ' s amendment 
on the basis of hostility to Labour Party, 
"The Committee seems, f ortunately, to be fully 
alive to this effort to make use of the 
(1) Argus, 25 June. 
(2) Ibid, 22 June. 
_ _ _ J 
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Parliamentary machinery for class ends. 11 (1) 
The Sydney Morning Herald attacked the ' class spirit ' in 
the Administration. (2) It denounced generally the pres-
ent Labour rule as one which began ' with profuse promises 
of moderation ' but on the basis of the Arbitration Bill 
it claimed, 
"••• that Labour in politics knows neither 
moderation nor compromise." (3) 
The Daily Telegraph also used the demand for preference 
to attack Labour by accusations which debased Labour ' s 
motives, 
"It has been explained scores of times by the 
labor leagues as that of subordinating all 
national concerns to the interests of a class, 
and using politics and principles merely as a 
me ans of aggrandising at everybody ' s expense, 
the limited section of electors comprised in 
the ranks of trade unionism." (4) 
(The Age it may be noted never became embr oiled in this 
kind of denunciation of Labour rule, attempting to report 
(1) I bid, 29 June 1904. See also Argus, 30 June, 
6 July 1904 . 
(2) S.M.H., 20 June 1904. 
(3) Ibid, 6 July. 
(4) Ibid, 19 May. 
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debates and members ' opinions in a neutral fashion.) (1) 
The major feature of the debates in the House 
itself was similarly the isolation of two major points 
of view. The Conservative members attempted on the 
strength of Glynn ' s amendment to again remove the basis 
of the act from the trade unions. Kelly described a 
situation in which, 
" ••• the court is to supersede the unions in 
all their functions, with the exception of 
the voluntary function usua ly connected with 
a benefit society." (2) 
The Conservatives were of course not si mply taking an 
op ortunity to a ain undermine unionism, not simply 
balking at giving the trades unions 11 ••• a legal status 
and special privileges ••• 11 (3) They saw in the prefer-
ence principle of 11 ••• a trades union Government11 , not 
an innocent act but, 
( 1) 
(2) 
(3) 
" ••• the Government fully realize that within 
a very short time the Bill would create a 
See generally Age, 25 
6 July 1904. 
May, 26 May, 27 June , 
C. P. D. VI II, 2801, 29 June. 
Ibid, 2725, 28 June. 
- - - __________________ _,, 
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great political machine ••• " (1) 
They therefore talked of, 
11 
••• the secret motive behind the Bill ••• 11 (2) 
Labour members reiterated their earlier posi-
tion that in order that the Bil might work it was necess-
ary to give preference to the trade unions in the form in 
which they were already existing. It was Spence who 
defended the correlation between giving preference to 
existing organizations and the successful workings of 
arbitration. (3) He stated that the amendment would 
bring about a " revolution" which 11 would destroy the trade 
union movement" as it is generally known. (4) The des-
truction of the unions would be through the loss of their 
independence, 
11 If it be carried 1/e sruill probably find an 
organization which is only a shadow of the 
employers ' union behind it forestalling the 
legitimate trades union." (5) 
Thus the effect would be to create ' bogus organizations ' , 
( 1) Ibid, 2807, 29 June. 
(2) Ibid, 2805. 
(3) Ibid, 2743, 28 June. 
(4) Ibid, 2742. 
(5) Ibid, 2825, 29 June . 
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who rould take the place of the trade unions and shut 
them out of the courts. Labour, it must be noted, 
attem ted to meet the objections of the House within 
the limits of retaining present organizations , 
"The existi ng unions can do all that is 
necessary to carry into e f fect t he provisions 
of the Bill •• • and therefore I ask why shou d 
fresh organizations e required ?n ( 1 ) 
They repeatedly condemned the amendment . Hughes called 
it impractical ' and involving ' a departure from the 
whole spirit of the measure ' . (2) Spence stated if 
carried , the original basis of the ill would e so 
destroyed • ••• the whole measure would have to be recast ' . (3) 
He could see no basis for the separation of irrlustrie.l 
an politica whtters. e ointed out to the .ouse that 
the unions had led active cam aigns for the eight-hour 
day and mining sarety regulations; both industria ma ters 
but when remedied it was by measures put through the Sta e 
Par iements. Thomas told the ouse, 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
" I would. ratber have no Arbitra t ion Bi J at 
all than not see effect given to that 
principl e .;, (4) 
Ibid, 2833. 
Ibid, 2836. 
I bid, 2743, 28 June. 
I b i d, 2833, 29 June. 
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Poynton asked, 
11 
••• is not the real reason underlying the 
ill to be found in the fact that a Labour 
r inistry is in power? 11 ( 1) 
and expressed the Labour mistrust of the Conservative ' s 
motives. The ' test of motives ' led to a deadlock in 
w1ich each party distrusted the other an in which 
positive steps needed to be taken to solve the speciric 
legislative problem. 
In the circumstances it was left to the 
Liberals to, if possible, suggest a compromise. The 
amendment by the Liberal Party member, Glynn, had been 
fo lo •;ed by another from a Liberal member • On 29 June 
.cCay attempted to modify the amendment by pointing out 
that under Glynn ' s arrendment, all organizations required 
to be formed only for the act. This, he stated, in pre-
venting an or·ganization (employer or employee) in exist-
ence from registering under the act, was a litt e extreme. (2) 
It was a modification that was not a political compromise, 
( 1 ) I id, 2911 • 
(2) Ibid, 2848. That the amendment be amended by 
the insertion after the words 'Provided that', 
line 1, of the fol o ing words, ' no such 
organization shall be entitle to submit any 
industrial dispute to the court when, and so 
long as, its rules or other binding decisions 
permit the appl ication of its funds to poli ti-
cal purposes, or require its members to do 
anything of a politica nature ' . 
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howeve~ it still separated entire y the industrial func-
tion and political nature of trade unions. Crouch and 
,.cLean supported this move and reiterated that, 
"This proposal (of preference) is the most 
serious attem tat clsss domination that has 
ever come under my observation ••• 11 ( 1 ) 
clearly sup orting the Conservatives. 
The problem of a compromise was com lex. ~atson 
state the Labour compromise, 
11 I am prepared to consent to an amendment w ich 
will have the effect of preventing preference 
being given to unions, if they have in their 
rules anything in relation to politics which 
is likely to detrimentally affect any persons 
who may desire to join them." (2) 
Groom, a Liberal sympathetic to the Labour aim in arbit-
ration, attempted to make a compromise, 
11 
••• we must look not merely at the objects of 
the Bill, but at its plan." (3) 
(1) Ibid, 2929. 
(2) C.P.D., 3028, 6 July. 
(3) Ibid, 2920 
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Groom ' s amendment attempted to use the objection to the 
political status of unions as a qualification relating 
solely to the preferential principle. The effect of 
his amendment he said would be not to prohibit any 
organization with political objects from submitting a 
dispute to the Court but to prevent such an organization 
from obtaining a preference. (1) This amendment was 
further amended by McCay which caused the amendment to 
no read, 
"No such organization sha.11 be entitled to 
any declaration of preference by, or to sub-
mit any industrial dispute to the Court, 
when and so long as its rules or other bind-
ing decisions permit the application of its 
funds to political pur oses, or require its 
members to do anything of a political char-
acter.11 (2) 
Labour accepted Groom ' s amendment but not :UcCay ' s. (3) 
The Liberal Party throughout the process of 
(1) Ibid, 2922. Groom ' s amendment read, "That 
the amendment of the amendment be amended by 
the insertion after the word 'enti tled ', line 
4, of the words ' any declaration of reference 
by ' , with the proviso that later he would move 
the omission of the words ' submit any indust-
rial dispute to ' • ,r 
(2) Ibid, 3072. The amendment was, "That ,Ar Groom's 
amendment be amended by t he insertion after the 
mr ' by ' , ine 4, of the :vords 'or to'. 11 
(3 · at son's statement, S . M.H., 25 July 1 904. 
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the crisis on preference was being torn apart. (1) ome 
Libera sin the situation ap ear to have ' crossed the 
floor ' • The key figures are Sir John uick and Deakin 
himself. Sir John uick is recorded as stating, 
u ••• what I do object to is a trades union 
1hich may be a trades union merely in name, 
and in reality a huge olitical machine ••• " (2) 
Deakin stated that the bodies created by the il and 
part of the machinery of the Court ought similarly, "to 
be put far above arty politics and their influence. 11 (3) 
He denied however that he bad altered his conviction. 
He referred to his Introductory Speech in w ich he saw 
the evolution of trade unions f'rom orientation to self-
ish interests (i.e. beneficia so ely to their members) 
to a si tua ti on "as ai s to the Court ••• " and 11 ••• also 
in the ub ic interest ••• " (4) is silence, he state , 
was the " ••• silence of innocence;" he had never contem -
ate unions as II art~r o i tica bo i es". (5) Yet it 
( 1) 
(2) 
3) 
(4) 
(5) 
See J. A. La Nauze, Alf'red Deakin A Biography 
Vol. 2, • 368. "In e feet our groups in 
Parliament - Labour, Reid ' s f'ree traders, and 
the two wings of the ibera rotectionists. " 
• • • , 2913, 5 Ju y • 
Ibid, 2979. 
Ibid, 2979. 
Ibi , 2979. 
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appears at this time eakin made a c ear move that demon-
strated his sympathies were not with a Labour Government. (1) 
meeting of a new Liberal organization was held at 
al arat; its program~e ras oft at nature which embraced 
opposition to 1 goverrunent by Caucus'. Deakin did not 
join it but agreed to move the reso ution ap roving its 
formation. \ hile doing this he made an extensive criti-
cism of the Labour party; control by ' extra-Parliamentary 
groups', use of the pledge, and he asked the organization 
to fight 'the machine'. (2) 
Poynton (Labour) denounced this pattern of 
iberal attitudes, 
11 I do not think t_riat in ustralian o i tics 
another instance can be found of ex-~inister 
after ex-minister voting against their own 
Bill. 11 (3) 
However in this amendment abour esca ed serious risk of 
defeat by one vote. y the vote of the following Liberals: 
Groom, Sir Lang on Bon~,rthon, Cook, Sir '~i iam Lyne, Isaacs, 
( 1) 
2) 
3) 
See J. A. La 1auze, Alfred Deakin A Biography, 
Vol. 2 , p. 373 for La ·auze ' s opinion that if 
eakin remained in po itics he must sooner or 
later find himself in opposition to Labour. 
Ibid, 374. ( ote this stand by Deakin led to 
a complete break with David Syme and the Age 
because Syme ' s primary interest was f isca and 
he objected to the protectionist Liberals moving 
towards Reid ' s ' free trade ' party . ) 
C.P.D., 2911, 5 July. 
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?auger and Storer, the Government secured the passage of 
an amendment which modified ~cCay 's proposal to deprive 
unions registered under the Arbitration Bill of their 
political complexion. 
(vi) "If that one vote be secured the Government 
will .-,eat.her the crisis." 
Age, 28 July 1904. 
Examination of Clause 62 is necessary to an 
understanding of the form of the Preference Crisis. The 
topic of Clause 62 was in reality however only a su sidi-
ary of the main problem of the preference principle. If 
preference was given to unionists it was unlikely that 
their form could be drastically modifie beyond qualifi-
cations relating to restriction of members and ,maccept-
able olitical goals. These Labour had already agreed 
to. (1) Thus it was that the recommittal of Clause 48 
was the vital issue to Labour, 
"The Government takes it s stand definitely on 
(1) C.P.D., 2723, 28 June. Labour was aware that 
the Court would, as in the case of the New 
outh ''ales Arbitration Court, refuse prefer-
ence under these conditions. 
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the principle of minority rule and differen-
tial rights.n (1) 
The debates on the resumed on 10 August. Mr 
\11 at son moved, 
"That the Bill be now recommitted to a Committee 
of the whole House for the reconsideration of 
clauses 4, 37, 38, 39, 46, 48, 52, 67, 68 and 
(etc.)." 
McCay quickly made preference the major issue; he moved, 
"That clause 48 be omitted from the clauses 
proposed to be recommitted." (2) 
Again it was the form of the amendment that was so sig-
nificant. Groom called it "a want of confidence motion 
in disguise 11 • (3) It created a situation in which Labour 
was trapped, unable to discuss the problem of preference. 
They were tied to a machinery clause and prevented from 
discussing anything but the principle of the recommittal 
of Clause 48. 
Labour and some Liberals denounced the amend-
ment. Sir William Lyne (Liberal) stated, 11 ••• I repeat 
( 1 ) D • T • , 25 July 1 904 • 
(2) C.P.D. VIII, 4155, 10 August. (It led to 
three consecutive days of debate • 
(3) Ibid, 4194. 
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that the Amendment now ef ore the House has been trickily 
submitted • 11 ( 1 ) The Labour Government ho ;fever expr esse 
a certain pride in , as it were, being martyred for Clause 
48. 11 'vho? n asked aloney, is responsible for de l ay in 
passing the Bill, 
"The columns of Hansard will sho I that the 
fault does not rest with the Minister ial 
sup orters." (2) 
Higgins also was clear on the validity of the stand being 
ma.de by Labour, 
11 
•.
1hen the people are asking for an Arbitrat ion 
Bill which will vork , we shall not give them 
a Bill wl ich will not work." (3) 
Isaac ' s plea that t he Government, 
" ... should have a full and fair opportunity 
to place their proposa l s bef ore honourable 
members. 11 (4) 
was neve realized. On 1 2 .August the Watson Government 
was defeated by 2 votes 36-34) and, having been refused 
a dissolut ion by the Governor General, resigned. While 
atti tude s to preference and the significance of prefer-
( 1 Ibid, 41 75 ., 11 .August. 
(2) Ibid, 4187. 
(3 ) Ibid, 4185. 
(4) Lonsdal e , Deaki n , Sir John uic and ·1. H • 
. illis all sup orted t he motion. 
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ence to he Labour movement had been c early tb.rashed 
ou over the eight days of de ate on Clause 48 and Clause 
62, it ha all too clear y become a weapon with , hich to 
efeat Labour. Sooe, ike eid, had use the Ar itration 
il purely with a view to office. Rei su oz·ted Deakin ' s 
o osition to include the pu lie service of the Common-
~ea t.h an State in the Bil , but afterwar s, on ·;atson 
taking off~ce, supported every attempt to cut down the 
effect of the vi tel clauses , while Sydney Smith (Rei ' s 
whi) both voted to put Vatson in and then on every divi-
sion to ut him out. (1) The i eral Party however held 
the responsibility of the crisis in two senses. The 
first was the importance of the radical i eras tote 
ab our os it ion, 
"Tl:e government might ave survived longer if 
a ew more mem ers of his (Deakin ' s) o ·m 
divided party ha joined with radica s who 
were already supporting it ••• " ( 2) 
The second reason was an identifiab e move br one wing 
of the iberels tovards eid ' s pa ty. This waste 
1 ) 
(2) 
See Age, 22 June 1904 for a denunciation of Reid 's 
tactics . 
• A. La auze, fred Deakin A iography, 
P• 3 2 • 
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accusation made by Laboui~ over t he prob em of recommittal, 
11 
• •• the action of honour ab e members of the 
o position i s prompted by a desire to pl ace 
cer t ain of their members u on the Treasury 
benches. 11 ( 1 
( 1) C .P. • , 2158. Ther e seems to be some validity 
in this statement. The next ministry was the 
Reid-McLean inistry which included J. ·~v . 
McCay as Mi nister for Defence while \i! cLean 
was , ini ster for Trade and Customs. 
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ill PART V CONCLUSION 
It seems unnecessary to review the themes dealt 
with in the main body of the dissertation. Instead, the 
Conclusion will take the form of a postscript on the two 
problems thrown up by the political crisis. The first is 
,.1cCay' s amendment of Clause 48 of tbe removal of a natural 
preference in the hands of the Court. The second is the 
idea inherant in Glynn's amendment of Clause 62, that the 
institutions themselves could be reformed in the 'image' 
of legislators. 
The fortunes of preference were vastly different 
when removed from the furore of political debate and placed 
in the cold light of Court awards. The clause of Prefer-
ence by majority demand stayed in the Act for six years. 
The clause was amended by providing that, 
( 1 ) 
" ••• whenever in the opinion of the Court it is 
necessary for the prevention or settlement of 
the industrial dispute, at' for the maintenance 
of industrial peace, or for the welfare of 
society to direct that preference shall be 
given to members of organizations ••• the Court 
shall so direct." (1) 
Quoted from J. T. Sutcliffe, A History of Trade 
Unionism, p. 236. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
J 
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This amendment did not lead to wholesale granting of 
preference. Henry Bournes Higgins , President of the 
Court of Conciliation and Arbitration from 1907-1921, 
only granted preference once, in 1912. This was in the 
case of the Queensland Tramway Company. Higgins gener-
ally was aware of the difficulties non-preference pres-
ented for unions, 
"It is, indeed, very trying for men who pay 
full dues to a legitimate union to work side 
by side with men who do not ••• " ( 1 ) 
His general outlook ho-vever, specifically his belief in 
the efficacy of the minimum wage, determined his attitude 
to preference, 
"The absolute power of choice (between appli-
cants for employment) is one of the recommend-
ations of the minimum wage system, from the 
employer's point of view - he can select the 
best men available when he has to pay a 
certain rate." (2) 
The principle of preference as tested by this case was 
subsequently squashed by the High Court. 
( 1) 
(2) 
H. B. Higgins, A New Province for Law and Order 
(Sydney, 1922), P• 17. 
Ibid, P• 16. 
j 
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If Labour had lost its preference by 1910, so 
had the Conservative force lost its proviso controlling 
the political status of unions. The principal Act con-
tained the proviso that no organization whose rules 
permitted of an application of its funds to political 
purposes or required its members to do anything of a 
olitical character could apply for or oppose an award 
giving preference. In the Australian V:orkers' Union v. 
the Pastoralists ' Federal Council of Australia, Mr Justice 
O'Connor refused to award preference because the rules of 
tt.e applicant union allowed t~e application of its f'unds 
to political purposes. In 1910 the Act was amended by 
striking out the proviso. 
000000000 
~: 
1 • 
- 92 -
1]: SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 
The unpublished sources have been used in Part 
IV of the thesis. For Parts II and II published 
editions of contemporary documents have proved 
adequate. 
Manuscript Sources 
The DEAKIN PAPERS are the personal collection of Alfred 
Deakin. The papers are deposited with the National Library 
of Australia. The two sections of the papers used in the 
thesis are the Correspondence (1903-4), and Deakin's copy 
of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Bill 
1904 (with his notes on the Bill). For reference, the 
letters when used are identified by writer and date. 
The FISHER PAPERS, the private papers of Andrew Fisher, 
are held by the National Library of Australia. The 
political articles, debates and speeches of 1904 contain 
a useful commentary of events. 
The DIARY of PATRICK McMAHON GLYI'fil is a recent acquisition 
of the National Library of Australia. Although not referred 
to directly, it provides invaluable comment, in Glynn's 
opinion,of individual members and events. 
The HIGGINS PAPERS are the personal papers of Henry Bournes 
Higgins. The material referred to was the correspondence 
of 1903-4. The papers are held by the National Library 
of Australia. 
The MI1'l1JTES OF THE FEDERAL PARLI.A fSNTARY LABOUR PARTY are 
still held by the Federal Parliamentary Labour Party. 
The Minutes are referred to over the period 1901-4. 
The MINUTES OF THE NE\ SOUTH vALES TYPOGRAPHICAL ASSOCI-
ATION are held in the Archives of the Australian National 
Uni ver sit y. 
- 93 -
2. Parliamentary Papers 
Australia: Commonwealth Parliament, Parliamentary Debates. 
1903-4, Melbourne . 
Australia: Commonwealth Parliament, Parliamentary Papers 
(Journals of the Senate: Votes and Proceedings of the 
House of Representatives; Reports, Accounts and Papers). 
1 903-4, Melbourne. 
3. Government Files 
The File on the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration 
Bill held by the ATTO~,NEY GENER.AL'S DEPARTMENT in Canberra. 
This file has a useful collection of contemporary docu-
ments. However only the ' Memorandum as to Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration to be laid before the Federal 
Government on behalf of employers in Victoria on 24 June 
1901' and an article on 'THE INDUSTRIAL ARBI1~ATI01 ACT 
OF NE V SOUTH WALES ' by the Honourable B. R. \l'lise, re:printed 
from "THE NATIONAL REVIEW", August 1902 have been quoted. 
4. Newspapers 
Ag~, The. 1elbourne, 1903-4. 
Argus, The. Melbourne , 1903-4. 
Daily Telegraph, The. Sydney, 1903-4 
Sydney Morning Herald, The. Sydney, 1903-4. 
5. Sooe Contemporary vorks 
Blac}: G., History of the New South Wales Labour Party. 
Sydney, 1 91 0. 
Gilchrest R. N., Bulletins of Indian Industries and 
Labour: No. 23, Conciliation and Arbitration. India, 1922. 
--~ -___________j 
- 94 -
Higgins H. B., A New Province for Law and Order. 
1922. 
Sydney, 
Spence W. G., Australia's .Awakenin,R. Sydney, 1909. 
Turner H. G., The First Decade of the Australian Common-
wealth: A Chronicle of Contem orar" Poli tics 1 01-1 O. 
Me bourne, 1911 • 
Webbs. and B., Industrial Democracy. London, 1922. 
6. Some Later Works: Articles 
Hagan J., 'Writing Union History', Labour History No. 14. 
1968. 
Hagan J., 'Employers, Trade Unions and the First Victorian 
Factory Acts', Labour History No. 14. 1964. 
McCarthy P. G., 'Labour and the Living Wage 1890-1910', 
The Australian Journal of Poli tics and History, Vol. XIII, 
No. 1. 1967. 
Nairn N. B., 'The 1890 ~aritime Strike in New South Wales', 
Historical studies Australia and New Zealand, Vol. 10, No. 
37. 1 961 • 
Nairn N. B., 'The Role of the Trades and Labour Council 
in New South Wales, 1871-1891 ' ., Historical Studies 
Australia and New Zealand, Vol. 7, No. 28. 1957. 
O'Connor J.E., '1890 -A Turning Point in Labour History: 
A Reply to Mrs Philipps', Historical Studies Australia 
and New Zealand, Vol. 7, No. 16. 1951. 
Philipps J., '1890 - The Turning Point of Labour History' , 
Historical Studies Australia and New Zealand, Vol. 7, No. 
1 6. 
Walker R. B., 'Australia's Second .Arbitration Act', Labour 
History, No. 19. 1970. 
~: The books consulted which deal generally with the 
nature of trade unionism in Australia are not 
included. 
- 95 -
Butlin N. G., Foundations of the Australian Monetary 
System. Sydney, 1968. 
Butlin N. G., Investment in Australian Economic Develop-
ment 1861-1900. London, 1 SE4. · 
Childe V. G., How Labour Governs. 1elbour·ne, 1964 
(First published 1 923). 
Clark C. M. H., Select Documents in Australian History 
1 851 -1 900. Sydney, 1 968. 
Crisp L. F ., Australian National Government. (First 
published as Australian National Government, 1965. 
Previously published as The Parliamentary Governr.ient 
of the Commonwealth of Australia, f'ir st published 1949.) 
Ebbels R. N., The Australian Labour Movement 1850-1907. 
(ed.) L. G. Churchward, Melbourne, 1965. 
Fitzhardinge L. F., William Morris Hughes A Political 
Biography. 2 Vols. Sydney, 1964. 
Gollan R., Radical and Workin 
of Eastern Australia 0-1 10. 
Jupp J., Australian Party Politics. Melbourne, 1968. 
La Nauze J. A., Alf'red Deakin A Biograph.y. 2 Vols. 
Melbourne, 1 965. 
Isaac J. E. and Ford G. W., (ed.) Australian Labour 
Relations Readihgs. Melbourne , 1 966. 
Sutcliffe J. T., A History of Trade Unionism in Australia. 
Melbourne, 1967. 
Turner I., Industrial Labour and Politics. The Labour 
Movement in Eastern Australia 1900-1921. Canberra, 1S65 . 
Walker K. F., Industrial Relations in Australia. 
Massachusetts, 1 956. 
u~,v SITY OF WAI A 
IBRARY 
